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Abstract
Justice Anthony Kennedy, now clearly the pivot of the Roberts Court, is the Court’s crucial voice in
environmental and natural resources law cases. Kennedy’s central role was never more evident than in the two
most celebrated environmental and natural resources law cases of 2006: Kelo v. New London and Rapanos v.
U.S., since he supplied the critical vote in both: upholding local use of the condemnation power for economic
development under certain circumstances, and affirming federal regulatory authority over wetlands which have a
significant nexus to navigable waters. In each case Kennedy’s sole concurrence was outcome determinative.
Justice Kennedy has in fact been the needle of the Supreme Court’s environmental and natural resources law
compass since his nomination to the Court in 1988. Although Kennedy wrote surprisingly few environmental
and natural resources law opinions during his tenure on the Rehnquist Court, over his first eighteen years on the
Court, he was in the majority an astonishing 96 percent of the time in environmental and natural resources law
cases—as compared to his generic record of being in the majority slightly over 60 percent of the time. And
Kennedy now appears quite prepared to assume a considerably more prominent role on the Roberts Court in the
environmental and natural resources law field.
This article examines Kennedy’s environmental and natural resources law record over his first eighteen years on
the Supreme Court and also on of the Ninth Circuit in the thirteen years before that. The article evaluates all of
the environmental law and natural resources law cases in which he wrote an opinion over those three decades,
and it catalogues his voting record in all of the cases in which he participated on the Supreme Court in an
appendix. One striking measure of Justice Kennedy’s influence is that, after eighteen years on the Court, he has
written just one environmental dissent—and that on states’ rights grounds, which is one of his chief priorities.
The article maintains that Kennedy is considerably more interested in allowing trial judges to resolve cases on
the basis of context than he is in establishing broadly applicable doctrine: Kennedy is a doctrinal minimalist. By
consistently demanding a demonstrated “nexus” between doctrine and facts, he has shown that he will not
tolerate elevating abstract philosophy over concrete justice. For example, he is interested in granting standing to
property owners alleging regulatory takings, but he is quite skeptical about the substance of their claims.
Another example of his nuanced approach concerns his devotion to states’ rights—which is unassailable—yet
he has been quite willing to find federal preemption when it serves deregulation purposes. On the other hand, as
his opinion in Rapanos reflects, Kennedy is far from an anti-regulatory zealot. But he does seem to prefer only
one level of governmental regulation.
At what might be close to the mid-point in his Court career—and with his power perhaps at its zenith—Justice
Kennedy is clearly not someone any litigant can ignore. By examining every judicial opinion he has written in
the environmental and natural resources law field, this article hopes to give both those litigants and academics a
fertile resource to till. Although Kennedy has been purposefully difficult to interpret in this field (writing very
few opinions until lately), his record suggests that he may be receptive to environmental and natural resources
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claims if they are factually well-grounded and do not conflict with Kennedy’s overriding notions of states’
rights. The article concludes with some comparisons between Justice Kennedy and Justice Holmes.

That Justice Anthony Kennedy sits at the center of the Roberts Court is hardly a secret.1 After
the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Supreme Court advocates know they must aim their
arguments at Kennedy, who seldom finds himself in the minority.2 In the environmental field (which
we define to include natural resources and land use law), Justice Kennedy’s pivotal role was cemented
1

See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Eyes on Kennedy as Supreme Court Debates Global Warming Case, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2006; Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Kennedy Key To Global Warming Challenge, SCOTUS BLOG, Nov. 29,
2006, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/11/26-week/.
Justice Kennedy was President Reagan’s third nominee to replace Justice Lewis Powell, after the Senate
rejected Robert Bork, and Douglas Ginsburg withdrew following revelations that he used marijuana. Kennedy, who
had served on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals since his appointment by President Ford in 1975, was confirmed
unanimously in February 1988. Kennedy owed his appointment to a longstanding relationship with Ed Meese,
Reagan’s Chief of Staff and Attorney General. Kennedy graduated from Stanford University in 1958 and Harvard
Law School in 1961, then practiced law in Sacramento, where he also taught constitutional law at McGeorge Law
School and worked with Meese on several projects, including a failed initiative to cut taxes and spending that was
supported by Governor Reagan. See http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_entity/104/biography.
Unlike several of his colleagues on the Supreme Court, Kennedy never was a judicial clerk, entering private
practice after graduation in San Francisco (1961-63) and Sacramento (1963-75). He taught Constitutional Law at
McGeorge Law School from 1965 until he was confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice in 1988. See Cornell Law
School Legal Information Institute, Supreme Court collection,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/kennedy.bio.html.
2
Of the seventy-six environmental decisions Justice Kennedy participated in that we consider in this study,
Justice Kennedy voted with the majority a remarkable seventy-three times, or 96% of the time. See infra Appendix A
case table. (These statistics include cases in which Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment only, or in which he
concurred in part and dissented in part.) Kennedy is a much better barometer of the Court’s environmental thinking
than he is in all cases: during his first eighteen years on the Court, Kennedy dissented a total of 354 times, out of the
874 decisions in which he took part, or 40.5% of the time.
Justice Kennedy’s record for voting with the majority in close decisions further illustrates his pivotal role at
the Court’s center: Kennedy voted with the majority in 81% of the environmental cases included in this survey that
were decided with a 5-4 vote. Of the seventy-six cases in this survey, fourteen rested on majority opinions joined by
just five members of the Court. See infra Appendix A case table. Kennedy voted with the dissent in just three of
these decisions. See Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), discussed infra notes 150-60;
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), discussed infra notes 39-41; and Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S.
262 (2001), discussed infra note 81. Two additional decisions rested on Justice Kennedy’s decision to provide the
crucial fifth vote in the judgment only, but writing a separate concurrence in each case. See Eastern Enter. v. Apfel,
524 U.S. 498 (1998), discussed infra notes 84-85; Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 126 S. Ct. 208 (2006),
discussed infra notes 188-96. In another case, Borden Ranch v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, an equally divided
Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit’s decision after Justice Kennedy removed himself from the case. 537 U.S. 99 (2002).
By the end of the first term for the Roberts’ Court, several commentators had recognized Kennedy’s newly
pivotal role alone at the Court’s center. See Dahlia Lithwick, A Supreme Court of One, WASH. POST, Jul. 2, 2006 at
B1 (discussing Kennedy’s emergence as the swing vote on the Roberts Court and the controlling effect of his opinion
in Rapanos); Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court's Helm, But He Isn't Yet in Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2006 at
A1 (placing Kennedy both literally and figuratively at Court’s center for the regularity in which he cast the deciding
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by his recent opinions in the Kelo and Rapanos cases, where he cast the deciding votes.3 While
Kennedy’s role in those cases has received quite a bit of commentary,4 there is no systematic
assessment of his entire environmental record.5 In this article, we aim to provide that assessment by

vote in split decisions in the Roberts’ Court’s first term).
3
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) (joining the opinion Justice
Stevens wrote for the 5-4 majority, upholding a city’s decision to use its eminent domain power to condemn
developed land for an economic development project because it fulfilled the “public use” requirement of the of the
Fifth Amendment), see infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy’s Kelo concurrence); Rapanos
v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (providing the critical fifth vote for the majority when he concurred in the
judgment). Kennedy refused to join Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos, instead writing a separate
concurrence that has more in common with Justice Stevens’ dissent than with Scalia’s opinion, see infra notes 187-96
and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy’s concurrence).
4
See Brent Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose: The Supreme Court Stretches
the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 81, 98 (2005) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Kelo and the public use doctrine); Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New London--Wrongly Decided
and a Missed Opportunity for Principled Line Drawing with Respect to Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REV. 17,
42-46 (2006) (advocating the more stringent standard of review for eminent domain in economic revitalization
projects that Justice Kennedy’s Kelo’s concurrence suggested). Kelo prompted a vocal and widespread backlash,
discussed infra note 172.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos generated a considerable amount of commentary in the press.
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Divided on Protections Over Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 20, 2006, at A1 (suggesting
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” may be the standard the Army Corps of Engineers adopts if it undertakes rulemaking to
define its wetlands jurisdiction); Warren Richey, Supreme Court splits over protecting wetlands, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Jun. 20, 2006, at USA 1 (discussing how Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of “significant nexus” will allow
for a greater degree of Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands than Scalia advocated in Rapanos); Charlie Tebbutt, Op-Ed,
Ruling befouls clean water efforts, EUGENE REGISTER-GUARD, Aug. 20, 2006, at F1 (discussing the Rapanos decision
and criticizing Kennedy’s opinion for “muddi[ng] the waters” of wetlands jurisdiction); David G. Savage, Déjà vu
Once Again: Despite New Faces on the Supreme Court, Term's Ending Is Familiar, A.B.A. J. Sept. 2006 at 12
(discussing how Justice Kennedy’s seat alone at the Court’s center made his vote the deciding factor in a number of
prominent decisions, including Rapanos, during the Roberts’ court’s first term); DOJ Plan for Dual Wetlands
Jurisdiction Test Wins Cautious Backing, 15 WATER POLICY REP., no. 16, Aug. 7, 2006 (discussing the U.S.
Department of Justice’s decision to use either Justice Kennedy’s or Justice Scalia’s tests to determine wetlands
jurisdiction post-Rapanos); William W. Buzbee, Supreme Court Decisions on Water Resources, testimony before the
Committee on Senate Environment & Public Works Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife & Water, Aug. 1, 2006
(describing Justice Kennedy’s opinion as the “key” to the Court’s ruling in Rapanos).
5
Richard Lazarus has, however, supplied a (now somewhat dated) assessment of the Supreme Court’s
environmental record as a whole. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV 703, 812 (2000) (hereinafter Lazarus, Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court) (rating Justice Kennedy’s environmental record as 25.9%, prior to 1998). See also Richard J. Lazarus,
Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 673 (2002). Lazarus’
analytic data has been more recently updated by Jonathan Cannon, in his cultural analysis of the Supreme Court’s
environmental opinions. In that study, according to Cannon, Justice Kennedy raised his environmental record to
34.1%. Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33 Ecology L. Q. 363,
441 (2006) (updating the environmental scores for the justices sitting on the current Court with data from recent
environmental opinions as part of a cultural analysis of the Supreme Court’s environmental opinions).
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evaluating all of Justice Kennedy’s environmental opinions, including those on the Ninth Circuit,
where he served for thirteen years before his 1988 appointment to the Supreme Court.6
One remarkable aspect of the Kennedy record is just how little there is of it. In a judicial
career spanning more than three decades, Justice Kennedy has written only twenty-one opinions that
can be characterized as within our broad definition of environmental law: twelve majority opinions,
eight concurrences, and just one dissent.7 Kennedy has been an active participant in the Supreme
Court’s decisions concerning constitutional takings of property.8 But apart from the takings area,
Justice Kennedy has not seemed very invested in environmental issues, at least when they involve
statutory interpretation.9 Perhaps that apparent disinterest was broken by Kennedy’s decisive
concurrence in Rapanos, where he refused to restrict federal jurisdiction over wetlands to relatively

6

See supra note 1.
Justice Kennedy has voted on many more decisions that these, but we believe those cases in which he wrote
opinions are the best reflections of his judicial disposition. At any rate, analyzing his opinions is much more telling
than guessing at his silences. In Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 542 (1998), Kennedy concurred in part,
dissented in part. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. This article counts that decision as a concurrence.
8
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034-35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(arguing for a standard based on a landowner’s reasonable expectations, which would also take into account
environmental factors); Eastern, 524 U.S. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (refusing to apply takings analysis to
retroactive legislation); City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, 526 U.S. 687, 694 (1999) (approving
the use of jury determinations in a regulatory takings case); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (holding
that the fact a landowner acquired his property after enactment of the challenged regulations did not automatically bar
the landowner’s regulatory takings claim if a previous owner could not take the steps to make the claim ripe, although
this result was tempered by the conclusion the landowner had not been deprived of all economic value of his
property); Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining Justice O’Connor’s
majority opinion repudiating the court’s use of the substantive due process “substantially advances” test in takings
cases but writing separately to highlight the possibility that some regulations “might be so arbitrary or irrational as to
violate due process”); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing for
heightened scrutiny for the use of eminent domain when the public use at issue is economic development) See also
infra notes 229-46 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy’s role in the Court’s decisions in takings
cases).
Eastern and Lingle both involved takings claims that did not occur in the context of land use decisions.
(Eastern addressed the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, discussed supra notes 82-87, while Lingle involved
an oil company challenge to a Hawaii statute limiting rent oil companies could charge service stations, discussed
supra notes 161-71. While not strictly environmental, both cases were included in this study because takings cases
have such a profound impact on environmental law.
9
Our colleague, Craig Johnston, pointed this fact out to us.
7
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permanent or continuously flowing waterbodies, instead opting for federal jurisdiction wherever there
was “a significant nexus” between a wetland and a navigable water.10
Even if his Rapanos opinion does not signal a change in Justice Kennedy’s interest in
environmental issues, he remains the indispensable vote on the Court. Richard Lazarus has pointed
out that Kennedy has an “astounding record” for being in the majority in environmental cases.11
Advocates in environmental cases must tailor their arguments to win his vote or risk losing their
appeals. Of the seventy-six Supreme Court environmental opinions considered for the purposes of
this article, Justice Kennedy was in the majority in an astonishing seventy-three times, or ninety-six
percent of the time.12 There is thus much to be gained by carefully examining the Kennedy
environmental record, for it may very well portend the future of environmental law in the Roberts
Court.13
10

Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Lazarus, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, supra note 5, at 714 (noting that Kennedy was in the
majority in 56 of 57 cases decided between 1988 and 2000).
12
See infra Appendix A (displaying tabular data of the Court’s environmental decisions during Kennedy’s
tenure). We are indebted to Richard Lazarus, whose methodology in selecting cases for his analysis of the Court’s
environmental opinions influenced our methodology for selecting the cases used in this study of Justice Kennedy’s
environmental opinions. See Lazarus, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, supra note 5, at 708 (stating the
reasoning behind selecting cases to include in his study of the Court’s environmental opinions based on whether
environmental protection or natural resources were at stake). We employed similar criteria to select additional cases
in which the environment or natural resources are at stake in the decision, including boundary disputes between states,
as well as cases involving areas of the law with a fundamental effect on jurisdictional issues in federal environmental
laws, such as the Eleventh Amendment, Fifth Amendment takings, and Commerce Clause authority.
13
At the beginning of the second term for the Roberts Court, a large number of commentators perceived
Justice Kennedy as the most influential vote on the Court in a variety of areas, including the environment. See The
Kennedy Court? One man with caprice make a majority, Editorial page, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2006, available at
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110009060 (noting the disproportionate attention being paid
to Justice Kennedy at the start of the Court’s 2006 term as a symptom of his newfound prominence alone at the
Court’s center); Warren Richey, Will the Supreme Court Shackle New Tribunal Law?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Oct. 16, 2006, at USA1 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s emerging role as the crucial vote in national security cases, as
well as in decisions involving a number of other “hot-button social issues”); Warren Richey, For Supreme Court’s
New Term: Rise of a New Centrist, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2006, at USA2 (speculating on how
Kennedy’s newly prominent role at the Court’s center may influence a number of key decisions during the 2006-07
term); Gregory Stanford, A High Court Tilts and Your Rights Get Squashed, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jul. 30, 2006
at J4 (describing Justice Kennedy’s centrist stance as the “saving grace” of the Roberts’ court’s first term); Deborah
Amos & Steve Inskeep, A Newly Conservative Supreme Court?, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Oct. 2, 2006 (identifying
11
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This article maintains that Kennedy is best characterized as a contextualist, attached to caseby-case fact-finding that links context to legal standards. His devotion to nexus between facts and
rules, especially evident in Kennedy’s standing opinions,14 also dominated his recent interpretation of
the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.15
Kennedy is also committed to states rights. He was part of the Rehnquist Court majority
which created the first limits on the federal commerce power in sixty years,16 and which also

social issues on which Kennedy assumes a more conservative stance than Justice O’Connor’s centrist views). Bill
Mears, Justice Kennedy Works on His Swing, CNN.COM, Sept. 29, 2006, at
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/25/scotus.kennedy/index.html (discussing Justice Kennedy’s pivotal role as the
Court’s “man in the middle” in several divisive social issues).
14
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five member majority in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., upheld a district court decision to submit a takings claim to a jury but rejected the more stringent “rough
proportionality” test as a means of evaluating takings claims that do not involve exactions for the purpose of
dedicating private property to public use. 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999), discussed infra notes 88-102. In his concurrence
in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. Justice Kennedy stood alone in suggesting that citizen suit provisions
in his view may interfere with powers conferred on the Executive branch by Article II of the constitution. 528 U.S.
167, 197 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring), discussed infra notes 120-21. Nearly a decade earlier, Kennedy disagreed
with Justice Scalia’s rejection of environmental plaintiff standing based on an “animal or vocational nexus” in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, and instead wrote a separate concurrence expressing his willingness to consider standing on
that basis should the Court be presented with different facts. 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring),
discussed infra notes 55-57. However, later in his Lujan concurrence, Kennedy appeared to question the validity of
standing under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act for its failure to “establish that there is an
injury in ‘any person’ by virtue of any ‘violation’ of the statute. Id. at 580. As a member of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Judge Kennedy wrote an opinion holding that a plaintiff lacked standing in a Clean Water Act citizen suit
because his injury was not redressable by injunctive relief, since the underlying purpose of the CWA citizen suit
provision, protecting clean water and the environment, was not served by the suit. Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d
1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), discussed infra notes 29-31.
15
See Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment) (writing separately to advocate requiring a “significant nexus” between a wetland and a navigable water
to establish CWA jurisdiction over a wetland); see infra notes 188-96.
16
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the Rehnquist
majority invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act, a federal law prohibiting firearms within 1000 feet of schools,
because it overstepped the congressional Commerce Clause power and writing a separate concurrence to emphasize
how the connection with interstate commerce was too attenuated to justify federal interference with state police
powers). Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 131 (1995)
(linking the Court’s backpedaling from New Deal-era interpretations of expansive Commerce Clause powers and its
decision placing limits on federal power in Lopez with earlier movements to federal power); Robert F. Nagel, The
Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 644-47 (1996) (discussing the analytic approach the Court took
in Lopez and its implications in other contexts); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 565-67 (1995) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s
interpretation of the federal power use the Commerce Clause to regulate non-commercial activity in his concurrence
in Lopez); Bradley A. Harsch, Brzonkala, Lopez, and the Commerce Clause Canard: A Synthesis of Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence, 29 N.M. L. REV. 321, 326 (1999) (criticizing Lopez as an underinclusive test for Commerce
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discovered significant state immunity from federal court suits in the Eleventh Amendment.17 Finally,
as a professed property rights defender, Kennedy is a government planning skeptic.18 These doctrinal
minimalist, states rights, and property rights sentiments do not always point in the same direction,
making Kennedy’s jurisprudence especially interesting to examine.
This analysis of the Kennedy record on the environment is in chronological order, beginning
with Kennedy’s tenure on the Ninth Circuit, proceeding to consider his Supreme Court opinions
before 2000, then examining his post-2000 decisions through 2004, and finally assessing his pivotal

Clause legislation).
17
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Rehnquist Court issued a series of opinions interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment to shield states from suits in a number of federal laws. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, a slim
five-member majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas held that Congress could not use the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
state sovereign immunity in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996). See Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1774 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh
Amendment decisions expanding state sovereign immunity); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative
Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 703, 764-65 (2006)
(characterizing the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh Amendment decisions as the source of the “most aggressive
limitations” on federalism in recent decades); David Milton Whalin, John C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth Justice:
State Sovereignty, Judicial Review, and Environmental Law After June 23, 1999, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. J. 193, 19495 (2000) (comparing the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh Amendment revolution with the “nullification doctrine,”
asserted that states could nullify acts of Congress that they, promoted most prominently by John C. Calhoun, the
slavery defender from South Carolina).
Justice Kennedy’s prominence in this line of cases is demonstrated by his authorship of two subsequent
opinions for the same five-member majority expounding on Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity. In Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, Justice Kennedy held that the state of Idaho was shielded from the tribe’s suit by the
Eleventh Amendment. 521 U.S. 261 (1997), discussed infra notes 69-82. Kennedy wrote for another five-member
majority two years later in Alden v. Maine, affirming a lower court dismissal of a suit that had been filed by probation
officers against their employer, the state of Maine, alleging that the state had violated the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, on the grounds the suit was barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 527 U.S. 706, 712
(1999).
The same five-member majority banded together yet again in Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded a state from lawsuits under a
federal law, this time preventing former employees of the state of Alabama from recovering damages from the state
for its failure to comply with Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). The
five-member majority finally broke apart in the Court’s 2003 decision in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs,
when Chief Justice Rehnquist held that a state employee’s suit against the state for its failure to comply with the
Family and Medical Leave Act was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because Congress had enacted the
legislation using its Fourteenth Amendment power to ameliorate past discrimination. Justices O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the opinion, and Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas dissented. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
18
See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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role in the environmental decisions of 2005-06, which spotlighted Kennedy’s central role in
environmental cases. Section I begins by discussing Judge Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit environmental
opinions, of which there are only a few. Section II turns to Kennedy’s early years on the Supreme
Court, from 1988 to 2000, including several important decisions on standing, takings, and
preemption. Section III proceeds to evaluate Kennedy’s opinions during 2000-04, highlighted by an
important majority opinion on takings and Kennedy’s sole written environmental dissent. Section IV
examines the decisions of 2005-06, focusing on the Kelo, Rapanos, and Lingle decisions.19 In section
V, the article profiles Kennedy’s contributions to discrete areas of the law, including standing and
ripeness, federalism, takings, and environmental statutory interpretation. The article concludes that
Kennedy is best characterized as doctrinal minimalist–attached to case by case fact-finding and
requirements that fact finders to show “nexus” between rules and context20–a states’ rights advocate,21
and a property rights defender, who is quite skeptical of government planning.22
I. Judge Kennedy on the Ninth Circuit
Judge Kennedy’s environmental record on the Ninth Circuit is sparse. Appointed by President
Ford in 1975, in over a dozen years on that court we were able to identify only four Kennedy

19

On Kelo and Rapanos, see supra notes 3-4, infra notes 173-85, 186-97 and accompanying text; on Lingle
v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005), see infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
20
Webster’s defines “nexus” as “a connection, interconnection tie, link; a connected group or series; a
predicative relation or a construction consisting of grammatical elements either actually or felt as so related.
WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1524 (1986). For a discussion of the “nexus” requirement in the
context of standing, see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 201 (1992) (noting that Justice Kennedy indicated in Lujan that he might be willing to
recognize standing based on some “nexus” theory); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1452-58 (1988) (discussing the Court’s use of a “nexus” requirement to restrict standing).
21
See Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Cons. v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), discussed infra notes 143-60 and
accompanying text.
22
See Robert A. Chaim, Justice Kennedy Inaugurates the Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture Series, MC
GEORGE MAG., 1991, at 10-11 (quoting Kennedy as remarking that “property provides the structural vehicle through
which we can protect ourselves against a blueprint for the future being imposed by government ... ever hungry for
self-aggrandizement”).
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environmental opinions. His first was a 1980 decision that overturned a lower court’s rejection of a
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) challenge by a citizens’ group to the Federal Highway
Administration’s funding of a four-lane expansion on Highway 2, outside of Glacier National Park in
Montana.23 The lower court ruled that the environmentalists’ suit was barred by laches, but a panel
led by Judge Kennedy reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs had not actually delayed bringing suit
for a decade, since the project had been expanded and final federal approval came some nine years
after it was first proposed in 1969.24 On the merits, Judge Kennedy concluded that the government’s
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the project was deficient because it failed to analyze the
secondary effects of the highway, and it did not include an adequate range of alternatives, since it
failed to consider the alternative of improving the existing two-lane highway.25
Two years later, in another NEPA suit, Judge Kennedy affirmed a lower court in a panel
decision upholding a Department of Housing and Urban Development determination not to prepare an
EIS on a redevelopment plan that would displace local artists in San Francisco.26 The plaintiffs
alleged that displacing local artists would “irreparably damage the cultural character of the area,” but
Judge Kennedy rejected the notion that a significant effect on the cultural environment triggered an
EIS, and he also noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a “causal nexus” between the
redevelopment and any significant cultural impact, the first of many Kennedy opinions demanding
“nexus.”27 This demand for the development of specific facts sufficient to show a close fit between

23

Coal. for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 780-81.
25
Id. at 784.
26
Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 670 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1982).
27
Id. at 184.
24
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the conflict at issue and the purpose of the environmental law would become characteristic of
Kennedy’s environmental jurisprudence, culminating in his 2006 Rapanos opinion.28
Another 1982 panel opinion of Judge Kennedy’s affirmed a lower court’s rejection of a
challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency’s allocation of wastewater treatment facility
funding as being used by local government grantee for purposes unrelated to water pollution.29
Unlike the lower court, which ruled that the expenditures were authorized by the Clean Water Act,
Judge Kennedy concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing, since by the time the suit was filed the
funds had been spent, and there was no guarantee of future funds.30 Thus, injunctive relief would not
redress the alleged injury, and the purpose of the statute’s citizen suit provision–to protect clean water
and the environment–could not be served by the plaintiff’s suit.31
In still another 1982 panel opinion, Judge Kennedy upheld an Oregon district court’s grant of
a preliminary injunction preventing the Yakama Tribe from harvesting Columbia River salmon. The
state of Washington sought the injunction in response to extremely low salmon counts at Bonneville
Dam in the spring of 1980.32 The tribe appealed the injunction, which included two fisheries located
on the Yakama Reservation,33 on the ground that the state’s fishing closure extinguished the tribe’s
treaty fishing rights without protecting the salmon. Although the 1980 spring chinook salmon run
28

See infra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1264 (9th Cir. 1982). This decision drew a concurrence from Judge
Wallace, who emphasized the distinction between constitutional and prudential standing, maintaining that the Clean
Water Act’s citizen suit provision eliminated prudential standing barriers and gave standing to anyone who could meet
Article III standing requirements. Id. at 1269 (Wallace, J., concurring).
30
Id. at 1267 (“[N]othing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to ignore or to test the
conventional requisites of justiciability.”).
31
Id. at 1266, 1268 (“T[he CWA’s] grant of standing does not extend to a review of appropriations where
the review and any judicial decree would be ineffective to vindicate environmental concerns.”).
32
United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1982). The 1980 injunction and the ensuing
litigation grew out of a suit filed by individual members of the Yakama Tribe in 1968 to protect treaty fishing rights
for Columbia Basin tribes, in which the tribe later intervened. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
The Yakama Tribe changed the spelling of its name from “Yakima” in 1993, in order to reflect its historic spelling.
29
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was over, the Ninth Circuit panel ruled that the tribe’s claim was not moot because, in light of the
ongoing nature of litigation over Indian treaty fishing rights, the tribe had a “reasonable expectation”
it could face a similar injunction in the future. Further, the sovereign immunity and jurisdictional
issues the tribe raised were also likely to recur in the case.34
Reaching the merits, Judge Kennedy rejected the tribe’s sovereign immunity, concluding that
the tribe had waived its immunity when it intervened in the original suit.35 He also rejected the tribe’s
argument that the injunction against fishing on reservation lands violated its treaty rights. Judge
Kennedy reasoned that if states have the ability to regulate treaty fishing to further conservation
interests without violating treaty rights, a federal court should have the same ability to do so.36 This
deferential treatment of the state’s position in this case would be reflected in his later opinions on the
Supreme Court.
Judge Kennedy’s few environmental decisions on the Ninth Circuit were not those of a
ideological jurist. He was not noticeably hostile to environmental claims, although he was hardly an
enthusiast. He produced remarkably few environmental opinions during a dozen years on the court, a
harbinger of his early years on the Supreme Court.
II. Early Years on the Supreme Court, 1988-2000
Any significance in Justice Kennedy’s role in environmental decisions during his first four
years on the Court must be deciphered from his silence between 1988 and 1991. Of the thirteen

33

Oregon, 657 F.2d at 1012.
Id. at 1012.
35
Id. at 1014. In addition to intervening in the original suit, the tribe had entered into an agreement with the
state of Washington in 1977, in which both the tribe and the state consented to resolve any disputes over Columbia
River salmon management in Oregon district court. Id.
36
Id. at 1016. Kennedy referred to the right to harvest salmon as the “res” of the treaty, concluding that
“[s]ince the existence of the salmon was inextricably linked to the res in the court’s constructive custody, the court
was empowered to enjoin interference with that custody.” Id. at 1015-16.
34
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environmental decisions he took part in during those four years,37 Justice Kennedy joined the majority
without writing an opinion in all but one decision.38 That exception was the Court’s decision in

37

Justice Kennedy did not take part in several environmental decisions issued by the Court shortly after his
confirmation. These included the Court’s decision that states acquired title to lands within their borders that were
submerged beneath tidal waters not navigable-in-fact when they joined the union, Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988); and the Court’s holding that the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment
did not prohibit the United States Forest Service from approving a timber sale in Northern California on federal public
lands that included sites sacred to the religions of several Native American tribes. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
38
See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (opinion by
Justice White holding that the Yakama Tribe did not have authority to regulate non-tribal lands within its reservation
boundaries); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (opinion by Justice Stevens for a
unanimous court holding that NEPA did not require a fully-developed mitigation plan or a worst-case scenario
analysis in an environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared by the Forest Service analyzing a proposed alpine ski
resort development in Washington state); Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (opinion
by Justice Stevens for a unanimous court, in a companion case to Methow Valley, holding that the Army Corps of
Engineers complied with NEPA in the EIS on the Elk Creek Dam in Oregon’s Rogue River Basin because a worstcase analysis was not required in the EIS, nor was a fully-developed mitigation plan; moreover, the Corps’ decision
not to supplement the EIS was within its discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (opinion by Justice Stevens holding that a non-Indian corporation leasing Jicarilla
Apache tribal lands for oil and gas production could be taxed by the state, as well as by the tribe, for the same
activity); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (opinion by Justice O’Connor dismissing a citizen suit
filed by a dairy farmer against the operator of a landfill on property adjacent to the farm for failing to meet the
requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act because the farmer failed to comply with the law’s
sixty-day notice requirement for citizen suits); New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350 (1989) (opinion by Justice Scalia holding that a federal district court improperly abstained from
exercising its jurisdiction when it characterized a suit filed by a utility against a local government for its failure to
fully reimburse the utility for plant construction costs as a complex state regulatory matter under exclusive jurisdiction
of the state); General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 30 (1990) (opinion by Justice Blackmun for a
unanimous court holding that EPA’s failure to approve a revised state implementation plan (SIP) under the Clean Air
Act within the four-month statutory deadline did not prevent the agency from enforcing the existing SIP); California v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990) (opinion by Justice O’Connor for a unanimous court holding
that the Federal Power Act preempted state minimum instream flow requirements for the Rock Creek hydroelectric
project); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (opining by Justice Scalia holding that an environmental
group’s challenge to the Bureau of Land Management’s “land withdrawal review program” for violating both the
National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act failed because affidavits by the
organization’s members claiming that they used lands “in the vicinity” of the lands affected by the challenged
decisions were insufficient to establish standing); Wisconsin Public Intervener v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991)
(opinion by Justice White holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not preempt local
government regulation of pesticide use when those regulations did not conflict with federal regulations); Illinois v.
Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380 (1991) (opinion by Justice Souter settling a boundary dispute between the two states by
declaring the boundary lies at the low water mark of the Ohio River as it existed in 1792).
In the final case from this era, Oklahoma v. New Mexico, Justice Kennedy joined all but one part of Justice
White’s majority opinion resolving a dispute over New Mexico’s diversion of additional water from the Canadian
River, which had been apportioned between it and Oklahoma and Texas by an interstate compact. 501 U.S. 221, 242
(1991). Kennedy also joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part on the
grounds that the Court’s interpretation of the Canadian River Compact, which gave New Mexico unrestricted use of
waters originating above the Conchas Dam but restricted its use below, was erroneous in that it considered water
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Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co, where Justice Kennedy joined both Justice White’s dissent, which
denied that Congress intended to waive state sovereign immunity in the 1986 amendments to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,39 and Justice Scalia’s
dissent, which denied that Congress had to power to waive the states’ Eleventh Amendment-protected
immunity even if it intended to do so.40 Kennedy’s joining Scalia’s dissent foreshadowed the
overturning of the majority opinion in Union Gas just six years later in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 41
the first in a series of opinions expanding state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.42
Justice Kennedy’s first notable environmental law opinion on the Supreme Court came five
years after his appointment, when he wrote a concurrence in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, in which the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, ruled that the constitution required that
landowners receive compensation for regulations which produced complete losses of economic value,
subject to several exceptions.43 This was quite a revealing opinion, for it indicated a significant

spilled over the dam not to have originated above the dam, and thus was subject to the Compact’s use restrictions to
ensure sufficient flows reach the downstream states. Id. at 244-45 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
39
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 28 (1989) (White, J., concurring).
40
Id. at 57 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor also joined this opinion. Kennedy’s decision to join even a partial dissent in an environmental decision is
notable because it has been an infrequent occurrence during his tenure on the Court. See supra note 2 (discussing his
remarkable record for voting with the majority in environmental decisions).
41
517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Seminole Tribe was joined by
Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Scalia, all of whom joined Justice Scalia’s Union Gas dissent. The key fifth vote in
Seminole Tribe came from Justice Clarence Thomas, who was appointed to the court two years after Union Gas by
George H.W. Bush in 1991. Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, Supreme Court collection, at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/thomas.bio.html.
42
See supra note 17 (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh Amendment revolution, expanding the scope
of state sovereign immunity).
43
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See generally Carol M. Rose, The Story
of Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
STORIES 237, 278 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, eds. 2005) (thoroughly discussing the context and
significance of the case, the latter of which Rose considered to be a prime example of “imbalanced propertization”).
In what must be one of the prime examples of the law of unintended consequences, the Lucas exceptions have proved
much more significant and enduring than the categorical takings rule the decision established. See Michael C. Blumm
& Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 329 (2005).
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divide separated Justice Kennedy from Justice Scalia.44 Kennedy joined a six-member majority in
Lucas,45 but he wrote a concurrence to emphasize his disagreement with Justice Scalia concerning the
scope of the exemptions from the Lucas compensation rule. According to Kennedy, Scalia’s
exemption from compensation for regulations preventing activities that would amount to common law
nuisances46 was too narrow, since the basic test for compensation for regulatory takings was “whether
the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.”47 Justice Kennedy’s view
was that because “courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever the source,” the
“common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of a regulatory power in a complex
and interdependent society.”48 He would therefore not subject all new regulatory initiatives to
compensation requirements where they produced economic wipeouts because changed conditions and
new ecological understandings might justify them; for example, coastal property “may present such
44

See Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights
Movement within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 759, 801-03 (2006) (noting Kennedy chose a “very different
analytic framework” to evaluate regulatory takings in his concurrence in Lucas from that advocated by Justice Scalia);
Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liability
for Fifth Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the "Rule", 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 943-45 (1999)
(discussing the “very different views” Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia expressed toward regulatory takings in
Lucas); F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc
Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465, 487-89 (2001) (discussing the divide between the Scalia and Kennedy view of a
property owner’s reasonable expectations); Peter C. Meier, Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach: Taking Takings Into the
Post-Lucas Era, 22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 413, 444 (1995) (arguing that courts should adopt Justice Kennedy’s approach to
defining total takings over that advocated by Justice Scalia in order to allow for a “broader understanding of
regulatory power”).
45
Justice Scalia wrote for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas. The Court reversed a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, which had upheld the state’s defense to
a landowner’s takings claim on the ground that the state Beachfront Management Act–which prohibited construction
of dwellings on the landowner’s barrier island property (rendering his lots “valueless,” according to a trial court
stipulation)–was a legitimate use of the police power and insulated from constitutional compensation by the so-called
“nuisance exception” to the takings clause because the state was preventing a public harm. Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 404 S.E. 2d 895, 901-02 (S.C. 1991).
46
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
47
Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). (“Where a taking is alleged from regulation which
deprive the property of all value, the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed
expectations.”)
48
Id. at 1035 (“In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole of our legal
tradition.”).
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unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in regulating its development
and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit.”49
His Lucas concurrence was a clear signal that Justice Kennedy was unpersuaded by Justice
Scalia’s agenda to advance landowner rights in a single judicial decree.50 Instead, Kennedy showed
himself to be a judicial conservative (as opposed to the radical Scalia), a doctrinal minimalist,51 with
an affinity for fact-specific determinations.52 His Lucas concurrence revealed Kennedy to be not
philosophically opposed to regulation if the need for it was evident from the record. His mention of
“fragile land[s]” as justifying regulation indicated that for Kennedy context was a key factor.
Another well-known 1992 case prompted another Kennedy concurrence. In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, a six-member majority of the Court ruled that environmentalists lacked
standing to challenge a Department of the Interior regulation exempting federal agencies acting in
foreign countries from the obligation to engage in Endangered Species Act (ESA) consultation before
undertaking proposals that could threaten species listed under the statute.53 Justice Scalia again wrote

49

Id. at 1035 (“[The] Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law.”). And indeed
lower courts have not restricted the nuisance defense to common law nuisances, see Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 43,
at 335.
50
See Lazarus, supra note 44, at 787-88 (discussing Justice Scalia’s efforts on the Court to promote a
property rights agenda).
51
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (discussing
trends in invoking minimalism on the Supreme Court).
52
See supra notes 26-28 (rejecting an argument that a project with significant effects on the cultural
environment required an EIS absent any “causal nexus” between the project and any significant cultural impact while
sitting on the Ninth Circuit in Goodman Group), infra note 69 (ruling that the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
invalidated by United States v. Lopez, was beyond the scope of congressional Commerce Clause authority because it
lacked a “commercial nexus”).
53
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). The case involved a challenge to a Department of
Interior regulation exempting federal actions outside the U.S. from the ESA requirement that federal agencies insure
their actions will not harm listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The environmental plaintiffs challenged the application of this exemption to several federallyfunded projects abroad, including U.S. involvement in rebuilding the Aswan High Dam on the Nile in Egypt and
construction of the Mahaweli Dam in Sri Lanka, funded by the Agency for International Development. Id. at 563. A
district court initially dismissed the suit on the grounds that the environmental plaintiffs lacked standing, but the
Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court issued a judgment in favor of the environmentalists both on the
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for the majority, conceding that “the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely
aesthetic purposes, was undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing,” but concluding that
the environmentalists suffered no “imminent injury,” since past visits to the species’ habitats
“prove[d] nothing,” and a mere intent to return in the future “without any description of concrete
plans” for doing so was insufficient to create standing.54
Justice Kennedy concurred in most of the six-member majority opinion,55 but he objected to
Justice Scalia’s categorical rejection that someone interested only in studying or seeing endangered
species “anywhere on the globe” could have standing under “animal nexus,” “vocational nexus,” or
“ecosystem nexus” theories.56 Although Kennedy agreed that the environmentalists in Defenders
failed to demonstrate concrete injury, he was “not willing to foreclose the possibility...that in different
circumstance a nexus theory similar to those proffered...might support a claim of standing.”57
Kennedy’s affinity to nexus showings was again evident.

standing issue and the merits, which the Eight Circuit upheld. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 118 (8th
Cir. 1990). The only issue the Supreme Court addressed was whether the environmentalists had standing. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 558.
54
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-64.
55
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O’Connor, dissented, on the grounds that the plaintiffs had standing,
since they had raised a “genuine issue” of material fact, and because the majority erred in broadly rejecting standing
for procedural injuries. Blackmun stated, “I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition
through the law of environmental standing.”) Lujan, 504 U.S. at 589-90, 606 (Blackmun, dissenting). Justice Stevens
concurred in the judgment because he did not believe Congress intended the consultation requirements of the ESA to
apply to activities outside the U.S., but he filed a separate opinion because he disagreed with the Court’s conclusion
that the environmentalists lacked standing. 504 U.S. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Souter joined
Kennedy’s concurrence. 504 U.S. at 579.
56
Id. at 579. Justice Scalia considered such theories to be “beyond all reason.” Id. at 566. Justice Kennedy
took more than six weeks to decide not to join Justice Scalia’s opinion because he wanted revisions to the section on
redressability, objecting to Scalia’s effort to require “particularized injury.” Justice Scalia made some changes, but
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence anyway, a decision which made Justice Scalia “irate,” considering it to
have “’scuttled’ his majority opinion.” See Robert v. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights
from the Blackmun Papers, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,637, 10659 (2005), citing Memorandum from Geoffrey M.
Klinebert to Justsice Blackmun (Jun. 2, 1992), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 591.
57
Id. at 579. (Kennedy, J., concurring), citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221,
231, n. 4 (1986), for the proposition that members of a whale-watching and studying organization would be adversely
affected by continued whale harvesting.
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Kennedy’s Defenders concurrence also cautioned that the Court should not be understood to
foreclose Congress from authorizing new causes of action: “As government programs and policies
become more complex and far-reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of
action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition.”58 He noted that “Congress has
the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before,” but maintained that Congress must “identify the injury it
seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”59 Kennedy’s
concurrence suggested that Congress failed to identify the injury the citizen suit provision of the ESA
sought to vindicate. Therefore, the ESA citizen suit provision did not obviate the need for plaintiffs
to demonstrate injury for standing purposes because “while the statute purports to confer a right on
‘any person...to enjoin...the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency...who
is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter,’ it does not of its own force establish that
there is an injury ‘in any person’ by virtue of any ‘violation.’”60 Although he agreed with the
majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a “concrete injury” requirement for
standing, he was unwilling to foreclose the possibility that a “nexus” theory of standing might be
appropriate under different circumstances. As in Lucas, Kennedy was unwilling follow the Scalian
common-law model as a paradigm for resolving modern environmental controversies.61

58

Id. at 580.
Id.
60
The requirement that a plaintiff show a “concrete and personal” injury to establish standing, Kennedy
wrote, both “preserves the vitality of the adversarial process” and “confines the Judicial Branch to its proper, limited
role in the constitutional framework of Government.” Id. at 581.
61
See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 215-20 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s tradition-bound arguments for a narrow concept of
Article III standing requiring actual injury); Daniel J. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the
Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547, 555-58 (1997) (discussing Justice Scalia’s “campaign
against environmental standing” in decisions restricting the judicial role in environmental laws). Justice Scalia made
59
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In another 1992 decision, a divided Court ruled that two Illinois hazardous waste licensing
laws that required worker training were preempted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA).62 Justice O’Connor authored the five-member majority opinion, concluding that the federal
statute impliedly preempted the state laws because they conflicted with the “full purposes and
objectives” of OSHA, which indicated that “Congress intended to subject employers and employees
to only one set of regulations.”63
Justice Kennedy concurred in part, but he disagreed with Justice O’Connor’s reliance on
conflict preemption. Instead, he would have found express preemption, as he thought Congress in
OSHA intended to displace state regulations, even where there was no actual conflict between state
laws and federal regulations.64 His willingness to broadly interpret the preemptive effect of OSHA on
state hazardous waste worker training statutes showed that Kennedy’s states’ rights perspective did
not extend to state laws he perceived to impose duplicative regulations on businesses.
1994 finally produced a Kennedy majority opinion in an environmental case, seven years after
his ascension to the Court. In Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, a town ordinance required all non-

clear his support for constricting standing extra-judicially, in a much-cited 1983 law review article. Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983).
62
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). The state statutes aimed to “promote job
safety” and “protect life, limb, and property” by requiring workers who may be exposed to hazardous wastes on the
job to take at least forty hours of training under an approved Illinois program, pass a written examination, and
complete an annual refresher course. See id. at 91. Federal OSHA regulations require hazardous waste workers to
receive at least forty hours of training off-site and a minimum of three days of supervised field experience. See id. at
92.
63
Id. at 98. Gade is among a number of Court decisions invalidating state statutes conflicting with federal
laws under the doctrine of “obstacle preemption,” in which a state law will be found unconstitutional if it interferes
with the underlying purposes of a federal statute. See Robert A. Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism,
91 Iowa L. Rev. 243, 262 (2005) (discussing recent Court decisions invoking “obstacle preemption” to conclude a
state law is unconstitutional although it does not conflict with the actual provisions of a federal law, because it
conflicts with the underlying purposes of a federal statute).
64
Id. at 109 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
Thomas. He concluded that “traditional police powers of the State survive until Congress has made a purpose to preempt them clear.” Id. at 121-22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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hazardous solid waste generated within the town to be deposited at a private waste transfer station that
would collect the waste and separate the recyclable from the non-recyclable material. The ordinance
in effect created a local monopoly by guaranteeing a minimum flow of waste to the station, which
would then collect a fee in excess of the market rate and, after five years, sell the facility to the town
for $1.65 A private recycler in the town, prevented by the ordinance from shipping to cheaper out-ofstate processors, challenged its constitutionality, and the Court, in a 6-3 decision, struck the ordinance
down as an undue burden on interstate commerce.66
For Justice Kennedy, even though the ordinance did not explicitly regulate interstate
commerce, “it [did] so nevertheless by its practical effect and design.”67 Such a burden could be
justified if it were the only method available to advance a legitimate local interest, but since there
were alternative ways of financing the town’s transfer facility, the ordinance could not, in Kennedy’s
view, survive judicial review.68

65

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387 (1994).
Id. at 384. Justice Kennedy wrote for Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice O’Connor
concurred in the judgment, while Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Blackmun.
67
Id. at 394. Kennedy relied on a long line of cases he termed “local processing requirements that we have
long held invalid.” Id. at 391-92, citing, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev. Co. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
(striking down an Alaska regulation that required all Alaska timber to be processed within the state prior to export).
He observed that “[t]he essential vice in laws of this sort is that they bar the import of the processing service. Out-ofstate meat inspectors, or shrimp hullers, [are] deprived of access to local demand for their services. Put another way,
the offending local laws hoard a local resource [for] the benefit of local businesses that treat it.” Id. at 392.
68
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence faulted the majority opinion for characterizing the “flow control”
ordinance as discriminating against interstate commerce, when in fact it discriminated against all competition, both
local and interstate, but she concluded that it nevertheless imposed excessive burdens on interstate trade in
relationship to the local benefits obtained. Id. at 401 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter’s dissent (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun) emphasized the fact that the ordinance discriminated against both instate and out-of-state providers, and “directly aids the government in satisfying a traditional governmental
responsibility.” Id. at 410-11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66
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In 1997, during his tenth year on the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote his second majority
environmental law opinion, in a case in which state sovereignty loomed large.69 The Coeur d’Alene
Indian Tribe sued the state of Idaho and several state agencies and officials in federal district court,
claiming that an 1873 Executive Order—which defined the boundaries of the original Coeur d’Alene
Reservation—recognized the tribe’s ownership of the bed and banks of Lake Coeur d’Alene long
before Idaho became a state in 1890.70 The district court dismissed the suit as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment’s sovereign immunity protecting states from federal court suits.71 But the Ninth Circuit
revived the case under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment, which allows
challenges to state officials implementing unconstitutional laws.72 The Supreme Court reversed, 5-4,

69

Between the Carbone and the Coeur d’Alene decisions, the Court decided United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), a non-environmental law decision but one with considerable implications for environmental law,
since the Court limited Congress’s Commerce Clause power–the basis of most environmental statutes–for the first
time in sixty years. For example, Lopez led to questions about the constitutionality of the application of the
Endangered Species Act to so-called non-commercial species. But four circuit court decisions upheld the application
of the statute to species with little or no commercial value on a variety of grounds. See Michael C. Blumm & George
N. Kimbrell, Flies, Wolves, Spiders, Toads, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act's Take
Provision, 34 ENVTL. L. 309, 327-41 (2004) (discussing the circuit court decisions).
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justice O’Connor, supplied the deciding votes in Lopez. His
opinion was quite revealing. Although he acknowledged that the history of the Commerce Clause “counsels great
restraint” from reviewing courts, Kennedy thought the Gun-Free School Zones Act was beyond congressional power
because gun possession had no commercial character, and the “purposes and designs” of the statute had no
“commercial nexus.” Where legislation reached beyond commercial activity “in the ordinary and usual sense of the
term,” the judicial role was to inquire whether the federal government was intruding on an area of traditional state
control because otherwise the states could lose their role as “laboratories of experimentation.” Lopez, 504 U.S. at
668-83.
Kennedy’s search for factual “nexus”—echoing his willingness to entertain nexus theories of standing in
Defenders, see supra notes 56-57, and his circuit court opinion in Goodman Group, supra note 27—would become
characteristic over the next decade.
70
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 264-65 (1997), citing Executive Order of Nov. 8,
1873, reprinted in 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 837 (1904). The executive order did not mention
the lakebed, but it defined one of the reservation’s boundaries as the point where the Spokane River joined Lake
Coeur d’Alene and “thence down along the center of the channel of said Spokane River ..." Id.
71
U.S. Const., Amend. XI.
72
Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994).
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with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, although his opinion was fully joined only by Chief
Justice Rehnquist.73
An ongoing violation of federal law is generally sufficient to invoke the Ex Parte Young
exception.74 But Justice Kennedy concluded that the applicability of the Young exception is a
function of a case-by-case evaluation of the facts.75 Under his factual scrutiny, the tribe’s suit was the
“functional equivalent of a quiet title action implicating special sovereignty interests.”76 Thus, the
Young exception did not apply because an injunction against state officials would prevent the state
from asserting jurisdiction over submerged lands, which were held in trust for the public, causing the
state’s sovereign interest in its waters to be “affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any
conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury.”77
In part of the opinion joined only by the Chief Justice, Kennedy explained that the
applicability of the Young exception must always be the product of “a careful balancing and
accommodation of state interests.”78 Justice O’Connor, for Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurred in
the result but did not agree with the balancing: where there is an ongoing violation of federal law, she
thought there was no requirement that federal jurisdiction should be predicated on a judicial balancing

73

Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 263 (1997). Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas
concurred, along with the Chief Justice. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
74
Id. at 281. See also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155, 159 (1908) (holding that a federal court
injunction preventing the Minnesota Attorney General from enforcing an unconstitutional state law did not violate the
Eleventh Amendment because when violating the federal Constitution, the state official is "stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct").
75
Id. at 280. Justice Kennedy ruled that the only way the tribe’s suit could proceed was under the Young
exception, since state sovereign immunity applied to tribes because they have the status as foreign sovereigns under
the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 269.
76
Id. at 262.
77
Id. at 287. This quote nicely foreshadowed Kennedy’s approach to the retroactive legislation at issue in
Eastern Enterprises, infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
78
Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 278.
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of federal and state interests in suits seeking prospective relief.79 Justice Kennedy and Justice
O’Connor did not often disagree,80 but in the Coeur d’Alene case, Kennedy showed himself to be
more devoted to judicial balancing and state sovereignty than O’Connor.81
In 1998, the Court invalidated provisions of the federal Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit
Act of 1992 that required companies previously employing coal miners to pay some of their health
care costs in retirement, even if the companies had left the coal mining business.82 A four-justice
plurality, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, thought that the statute worked a compensable taking of
property by “impos[ing] severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have
anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties’
experience.”83 Supplying the decisive fifth vote to strike down the statute, Justice Kennedy disagreed
with the plurality on the takings issue, finding that “the mechanism by which the Government injures
Eastern is so unlike the act of taking specific property that it is incongruous to call the Coal Act a
taking....”84
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Id. at 291 (O’Connor, J., concurring). However, Justice O’Connor thought that the Young exception was
inapplicable in this case because an injunction against state officials would amount to divesting the state of regulatory
authority, the equivalent of a quiet title action to sovereign lands, and thus the suit was effectively against the state
itself, and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
80
See supra note 155, noting that Justices Kennedy and O’Connor were in agreement 89% of the cases
discussed in this study in which both participated. Their tendency to agree in environmental cases is also reflected in
O’Connor’s environmental protection score, as updated by Cannon, supra note 5, which as of the 2004 term was
36.1%, just 2% better than Justice Kennedy’s score of 34.1%. Id.
81
The tribe ultimately prevailed when it persuaded the federal government, which is not limited by the
Eleventh Amendment, to file suit against the state, and a 5-4 Court upheld the tribal claim as a valid pre-statehood
reservation. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). Justice Souter wrote a majority opinion in the case, joined
by Justices Stevens, Breyer, O’Connor, and Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion,
which took issue with the majority’s opinion because the Chief Justice did not find sufficient evidence of
congressional intent to convey the submerged lands beneath Lake Coeur d’Alene prior to granting Idaho statehood.
Id. at 288 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This case was one of Justice Kennedy’s three full environmental dissents. In
Eastern Enterprises (infra notes 83-85) and accompanying text, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but
dissented in part. See infra Appendix A case table.
82
Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (interpreting 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-22).
83
Id. at 528-29. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion.
84
Id. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
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In the absence of a specific property interest to trigger the takings clause, Kennedy maintained
that the retroactive effect of the legislation was more appropriately evaluated under the due process
clause, not the takings clause.85 His reluctance to employ the takings clause to scrutinize the wisdom
of legislation would eventually gain a majority of the Court in 2005 in the Lingle decision.86 On the
other hand, Kennedy’s willingness to entertain a revival of substantive due process, at least in the case
of a statute imposing retroactive liability, might be the product of his fidelity to factual analysis, as he
was able to employ the substantive due process inquiry to balance the health problems of former coal
company employees against the retroactive nature of the liability imposed on the companies in favor
of the latter.87
In 1999, Justice Kennedy wrote his third environmental law majority opinion for the Court,
concerning a long-running dispute over the proposed development of an environmentally sensitive
thirty-seven acre tract of beach in Monterey, California, that had been formerly used as an oil
terminal.88 The developer originally proposed 344 residential units, which was scaled back during
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Id. at 547-49:
Although we have been hesitant to subject economic legislation to due process
scrutiny as a general matter, the Court has given careful consideration to due
process challenges to legislation with retroactive effects....The case before us
represents one of the rare instances where the Legislature has exceeded the limits
imposed by due process. [By] creating liability for events which occurred 35
years ago the Coal Act has a retroactive effect of unprecedented scope.
The four-member dissent agreed with Justice Kennedy that the statute should be evaluated on due process
grounds, but thought that the lifetime benefits required by the legislation were reasonable considering the profits that
the coal miners provided to the corporation and the foreseeable nature of the miners’ illnesses. Id. at 558 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
86
See infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
87
Id. at 549-50 (“While we have upheld the imposition of liability on former employers based on past
employment relationships, the statutes at issue were remedial, designed to impose an ‘actual, measurable cost on [the
employer’s] business’ which the employer had been able to avoid in the past ... The Coal Act, however, does not
serve this purpose. Eastern was once in the coal business and employed many of the beneficiaries, but [their]
expectation of lifetime benefits [was] created by promises and agreements made long after Eastern left the coal
business ... [This] case is far outside the bound of retroactivity permissible under our law.”)
88
City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 694 (1999).
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five years of negotiations with the city to 190 units.89 Even though the 190-unit development
preserved roughly half of the acreage as open space, the city council ultimately denied land use
approval, citing concerns over the adequacy of public access and environmental damage, especially
destruction of habitat of the endangered Smith’s Blue Butterfly.90 The developer filed a federal suit
under section 1983,91 alleging a compensable taking. After an initial round of litigation over the
ripeness of the city’s appeal,92 the district court submitted the developer’s takings claim to a jury,
which awarded the developer $1.45 million in temporary taking damages.93 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, ruling that the takings claim was properly submitted to the jury, and that the evidence
supported the developer’s contention that the city’s repeated denials were disproportionate to the
proposal’s nature and effect.94 The Supreme Court accepted certiorari.95
Justice Kennedy wrote for a narrow five-member majority, which upheld the appropriateness
of submitting the takings claim to the jury, although the Court unanimously rejected the application of
89

Id. at 695-96.
Id. at 662. The oil company that formerly owned the property had introduced non-native ice plant to help
control erosion on the site. The ice plant crowded out native plants, spreading over a quarter of the property by the
time of the proposed development. The invasive ice plant crowded out native buckwheat, habitat for the endangered
Smith’s Blue Butterfly (Euphilotes enoptes smithi). Id. at 695. The Smith’s Blue Butterfly, which lives in two
species of buckwheat on the California coast from Monterey Bay through Point Gorda was listed as an endangered
species under the ESA in 1976, after invasive plants and coastal development destroyed much of its native habitat. 41
Fed. Reg. 22,041 (Jun. 1, 1976). See Essig Museum of Entomology, University of California at Berkeley,
“California’s Endangered Insects,” http://essig.berkeley.edu/endins/euphilsm.htm.
91
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (making those who use the color of state law to deprive citizens of their rights under
federal law liable to the injured party).
92
The district court ruled that the developer’s takings claim was not ripe because it failed to exhaust its
remedies under state law, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that California law did not authorize
compensation for a temporary taking. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1506
(9th Cir. 1990).
93
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996). The
developer won temporary taking damages, despite the fact that the value of the property increased substantially
throughout the protracted litigation: selling for $3.7 million in 1984, three years after the case was filed, and then
selling again to the state for $4.5 million in 1991. See Nancy E. Stroud, Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterrey: How
Far Does It Limit Rough Proportionality in Land Use Cases?, ABA PROPERTY AND PROBATE MAG.,
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/magazine/2000/so00stroud.html.
94
Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd. v. City of Monterrey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1432 (9th Cir. 1996).
90
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the “rough proportionality” test of Dolan v. Tigard96 to land use decisions not involving exactions
dedicating private property to public use.97 However, the jury issue fractured the Court.
Justice Kennedy decided that the jury was not evaluating the reasonableness of the city’s land
use regulations, just whether the city’s rejection of the Del Monte development was reasonably related
to a legitimate public purpose.98 Consequently, it was within the trial court’s discretion to grant a jury
trial.99 Further, Kennedy ruled that a federal suit seeking damages for an unconstitutional denial of
compensation for a taking fell within the scope of the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial.100
But his opinion was careful to limit the scope of the Court’s decision availability of federal jury trials
to section 1983 suits challenging the reasonableness of a specific governmental denial, not to
challenge the reasonableness of the regulations themselves.101 Justice Scalia’s concurrence advocated
a much broader federal right to jury trials, while the four-member dissent, authored by Justice Souter,
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City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 523 U.S. 1045 (1998).
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that conditioning a hardware store’s building permit on dedication of a
public greenway and bicycle path lacked a “rough proportionality” to the public costs of the development, and thus
was a taking under the Fifth Amendment). In a memo to Justice Blackmun regarding the case, Kennedy noted that
agreed with Scalia’s suggestion that Rehnquist include the phrase “rough proportionality” in the Dolan opinion
because he felt the case needed stronger language to ensure that land use regulators sufficiently justified regulatory
exactions, thinking “it important to state that the exaction must be commensurate, though not to the point of
demanding exact mathematical precision.” See Percival, supra note 36, at 10,656, quoting a Memorandum from
Justice Kennedy to Chief Justice Rehnquist (May 16, 1994), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 645. Blackmun
included in his notes on the Dolan decision that Kennedy had remarked that “the cities are not hurting” and that the
“burden of proof [is] on the city” to justify an exaction. Id.
97
Both the majority, Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 703, and the dissent, id. at 733 (Souter, J., dissenting)
agreed that Dolan’s “rough proportionality” test was not applicable to this case, since it involved no exaction
requiring dedication of private land to the public.
98
Id. at 706.
99
Id. at 721.
100
Id. at 720-21 (“whether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a
predominantly factual question. ... in actions at law otherwise within the purview of the Seventh Amendment, this
question is for the jury.” Id. at 721-22.)
101
Id. at 721-22 (interpreting the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and distinguishing a takings claim from a
condemnation claim, in which there is no right to a jury trial).
96
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denied any federal right to a jury trial for takings claimants.102 Characteristically, Justice Kennedy
pursued a middle road between the Scalian position and that of the Court’s moderates.
Justice Kennedy authored another majority environmental law opinion—his fourth—also in
1999, involving public lands. The Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 reserved “coal” on certain
public lands to the federal government, which the government then made available for homesteading,
including lands the Southern Ute Tribe had ceded to the United States in 1880.103 In 1938, the federal
government conveyed any interest it had in the ceded lands, including its “coal” rights, back to the
tribe. Subsequently, coalbed methane gas became an important energy resource, and oil and gas
producers obtained rights to extract it from the homesteaders’ successors. In 1991, the Southern Ute
Tribe filed suit, claiming that it owned the coalbed methane gas, since the gas was included in the
government’s reservation in the 1909 and 1910 statutes.104 The district court ruled against the tribe,
but the Tenth Circuit reversed.105
In a 7-1 decision, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Amoco v. Southern Ute Tribes
reversed, rejecting the tribe’s claims.106 Kennedy observed that the question was “not whether, given
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Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 733 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 869-70 (1999) (citing Coal Lands Act of
1909, 35 Stat. 844, 30 U.S.C. § 81; Coal Lands Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 583, 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85) (explaining the
context of the Coal Lands Acts, which followed a 1906 withdrawal of 64 million acres of public land from
homesteading by President Theodore Roosevelt to prevent coal companies from employing homestead laws to
speculate in coal).
104
Id. at 871.
105
See Southern Ute Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1154 (D. Colo. 1995 (holding Congress
intended the reserve solid rock coal, not coal bed methane gas, based on the plain meaning of the term “coal”);
Southern Ute Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 826 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding the text of the Coal Lands Acts
did not indicate one way or the other whether Congress intended to reserve coal bed methane gas, and ambiguities
mineral reservations should be resolved in favor of the government). An en banc panel of the 10th Circuit upheld this
decision. Southern Ute Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998).
106
Amoco, 526 U.S. at 880. Justice Breyer did not take part in the decision. Only Justice Ginsburg
dissented. Id. at 880-81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that ambiguities in land grants should be construed in
favor of the federal government, especially since at the time of the Coal Lands Acts, the gas was considered a
potential liability that would have been the responsibility of whoever had title to the coal).
103
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what scientists know today, it makes sense to regard [coalbed methane] gas as a constituent of coal
but whether Congress so regarded it in 1909 and 1910.”107 He concluded that Congress did not, since
the “common conception” of coal when the statutes passed was solid rock; in fact, the associated gas
was considered a dangerous and valueless byproduct.108 This “natural interpretation” of the meaning
of “coal” in 1909-10 as not encompassing the associated gas was sufficient to persuade Kennedy and
the majority not to employ the public land law interpretive canon that “ambiguities in land grants are
construed in favor of the sovereign or the competing canons relied on by [the tribe].”109 Among the
latter, which Justice Kennedy disregarded, was the Indian law canon that courts should construe
ambiguities in favor of tribes and interpret statutes liberally in their favor.110
This result was strange, given that both the federal government and the tribe argued that the
Coal Lands Acts reserved the methane gas. But Kennedy and the majority were unwilling to defer to
the government, the public land canon, and the Indian law canons; instead, they favored a “natural
interpretation” of the meaning of “coal” ninety years earlier.111 Perhaps Kennedy viewed the case as
the equivalent of an attempt to impose retroactive property loss on the oil and gas companies.112
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Id. at 873.
Id. at 875.
109
Id. at 880.
110
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 119-24 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., LexisNexis 2005)
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(1982).
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Amoco, 526 U.S. at 880.
Note the similarity to Kennedy’s aversion to retroactive regulation in Eastern Enterprises, supra note 87,
as well as the sentiments he voiced in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, supra notes 79-81.
Dean David Getches has shown how the Court frequently employs subjective equitable balancing in Indian
cases rather than employ foundational Indian law principles. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist
Court's Pursuit Of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 346-49 (2001).
See also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian
Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1644-45 (1996) (surveying Justice Kennedy’s Indian law jurisprudence, which includes
joining every opinion denying tribal sovereign immunity, and noting that Justice Kennedy “has displayed a profound
disinterest in Indian law”).
112
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IV. Decisions of 2000-04
Whether environmentalists could maintain a Clean Water Act citizen suit for civil penalties
drew a curious concurrence from Justice Kennedy in 2000 in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw. The
environmentalists claimed that they fished in and recreated on waters polluted by a company’s
mercury discharges in violation of its Clean Water Act permit.113 The district court agreed that
company violated its permit and imposed a civil fine of over $400,000, but it declined to issue an
injunction because the company had achieved substantial compliance with its permit during the
litigation.114 The Fourth Circuit reversed, on the ground that the environmentalists’ suit was moot,
since the only available remedy, the payment of civil penalties to the government, would not redress
any injury they suffered.115
The Supreme Court upheld the environmentalists’ standing, reversing the Fourth Circuit in a
7-2 decision written by Justice Ginsburg,116 who ruled that civil penalties in citizen suits do in fact
redress a plaintiff’s injuries, due to the deterrent effect they have on future violations.117 The majority
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Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. 167, 704-05 (2000).
See id. at 703.
115
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4th Cir. (1998).
116
Although Justice Ginsburg attended Harvard Law School for a year, she graduated from Columbia Law
School. When she was nominated by President Clinton, Kennedy sent a note to Justice Blackmun (like Kennedy, a
Harvard Law School graduate) that the court was still one vote short of a Harvard Law School majority (with
Ginsburg replacing Byron White, a Yale Law School alum), although he did state, “But if you are patient, we shall
prevail. Tony.” See Percival, supra note 36, at 10,661, citing Note from Justice Kennedy to Justice Blackmun (Jun.
14, 1993), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 116. And Justice Kennedy was correct: with the appointment of Chief
Justice Roberts, Harvard Law School now has a five-member majority on the Court.
117
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 185. The Court distinguished Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (no standing for environmentalists to bring a suit for civil penalties because the
company agreed to comply with the permit, so no redressability) on the ground that in Steel Company, there was no
allegation of any continuing or imminent violation, whereas in Laidlaw the violations were “ongoing at the time of the
complaint” and “could continue into the future if undeterred.” Id. at 188. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented
because they believed Steel Company should have controlled, since “a plaintiff’s desire to benefit from the deterrent
effect of a public penalty for past conduct can never suffice to establish [standing].” Id. at 717. Justice Kennedy
joined the majority in Steel Company, but he also joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence which cautioned against
interpreting the Court’s opinion to apply to list an “exhaustive list of circumstances under which a federal court may
exercise judgment” in assuming jurisdiction, an apparent effort to preserve trial court discretion and limit the reach of
114
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also held that the suit was not moot, since the company failed to prove that it was “absolutely clear”
that the permit violations would not recur.118
Justice Kennedy issued a cryptic concurrence in Laidlaw raising the question of the
constitutionality of civil penalties in citizen suits: “Difficult and fundamental questions are raised
when we ask whether exactions of public fines by private litigants, and the delegation of Executive
power which might be inferable from the authorization, are permissible in view of the responsibilities
committed to the Executive by Article II of the Constitution of the United States.”119 With these
words, Kennedy seemed to open the door for constitutional challenges based on congressional
interference with Article II’s directive that the President “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”120
Another Kennedy 2000 environmental opinion, this one for a unanimous Court–his fifth
environmental law majority opinion—returned to the issue of preemption. In United States v. Locke,
the Court invalidated Washington state laws, passed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
regulating oil tankers in the state’s waters.121 An oil tanker trade association challenged the state’s
regulations on the grounds that federal uniformity preempted state authority to regulate vessels. After

the majority’s opinion. Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 110 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
118
Id. at 193.
119
Id. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3.
121
529 U.S. 89, 98 (2000). Washington created a state Office of Marine Safety and directed it to devise
standards for spill prevention plans which provided the “best achievable protection” from oil spills. The ensuing
regulations developed by the agency regulated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. If a
vessel failed to comply with these regulations, it could be subject to penalties, restrictions on its ability to operate in
the state’s waters, or be barred from access to the state’s waters. Id. at 97. See Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.040(3)
(directing the Office of Marine Safety to develop oil tanker standards); Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-21-130, 317-21200–265 (providing requirements for oil tankers operating in Washington waters); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 88.46.070,
88.46.080, 88.46.090 (establishing possible sanctions for violating the operating requirements).
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the district court upheld the state regulations, the federal government intervened on behalf of the
tanker operators, but the Ninth Circuit upheld all but one of the state regulations.122
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Kennedy interpreted the savings clause in the Oil
Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990,123 legislation Congress passed as its own reaction to the Exxon Valdez,
to create only a limited exception to the general rule of federal preemption in maritime law, allowing
states to continue to enforce liability rules against companies responsible for oil spills. 124 Subject to
this limited exception in the OPA, Kennedy ruled that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972125
controls vessel regulation, and the OPA did not affect the 1972 law’s preemptive effect on conflicting
state regulations.126 While a state may have a legitimate interest in passing regulations to prevent an
environmental disaster such as an oil spill, he maintained that the Court must inquire as to whether the
local laws are consistent with the federal scheme, informed by the context of the 1972 statute which
established a federal objective of providing “uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce.”127
The Court therefore invalidated some of the Washington regulations as preempted by federal law and
remanded the remainder for reconsideration by the district court. Justice Kennedy did acknowledge
the potential widespread harm to the environment that the state was attempting to avoid, but he
maintained that the Court had to focus on “political responsibility,” and he made no effort to
determine whether the federal laws alone provided adequate protection to the marine environment.128
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Locke, 529 U.S. at 98, citing Int’l Ass’n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.
Wash. 1996) and Int’l Ass’n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 f.3d 1053 (1998).
123
33 U.S.C. § 2718.
124
Locke, 529 U.S. at 105.
125
33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232(a).
126
Id. at 107.
127
Id. at 108.
128
Id. at 116: “When one contemplates the weight and immense mass of oil ever in transit by tankers, the
oil’s proximity to coastal life, and its destructive power even if a spill occurs far upon the open sea, international,
federal, and state regulation may be insufficient protection. Sufficiency, however, is not the question before us.”
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In 2001, Kennedy issued another important environmental law majority opinion, his sixth,
when he wrote for a 5-4 majority that overturned the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s rejection of
Anthony Palazzolo’s takings claim concerning the state’s denial of his plans to develop his coastal
property by filling wetlands–actually, a salt marsh subject to tidal flooding.129 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court upheld a trial court decision rejecting Palazzolo’s argument that the state’s wetland
regulations worked a taking of his property because 1) his claim was not ripe, 2) he had no right to
challenge regulations that pre-dated his acquisition of the site,130 and 3) the uplands on his property
remained developable, thus providing Palazzolo with substantial economic value.131
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Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611-14 (2001).
Palazzolo’s corporation actually acquired the site in the 1950s, before enactment of the state’s wetland
regulations. But by the time the state dissolved the corporation in 1978 (because of tax delinquency), and title passed
to Palazzolo as an individual, the state’s wetland regulations were in effect. See id. at 614.
131
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000). The court reached its conclusion that
Palazzolo’s takings claim was not ripe because he had never applied for a permit to develop the seventy-four lot
subdivision he used as the basis for his claim. Nor had he applied to develop the land in a manner that would involve
less intensive filling of wetlands.
130
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Writing for a fractured Court,132 Justice Kennedy reversed on the ripeness and pre-existing
regulation grounds. As in Del Monte Dunes,133 Palazzolo had submitted multiple unsuccessful
applications, and because of the “unequivocal nature” of the state’s regulations, Kennedy concluded
that submission of further development plans would have been futile, and therefore the suit was
ripe.134 Moreover, the majority overturned the state court rule barring a takings challenge because of
regulations pre-dating the landowner’s acquisition of the property, declaring that “[t]he State may not
put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”135 Thus, the Court rejected the so-called
“notice rule,” by which government defendants could categorically defeat takings claims where the
landowner acquired after promulgation of the restrictive regulation.136 According to Justice Kennedy,
132

Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion, both Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia filed separate concurring opinions. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
610. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence emphasized that the Court’s holding that post-regulatory acquisition of a
property did not automatically bar a takings claim should not be interpreted to mean that the prior existence of the
regulation was not relevant to whether a taking occurred within the framework of Penn Central balancing (see infra
note 138 and accompanying text) as elements of the regulation’s effect on both investment-backed expectations and
the character of the government action. Id. at 633-34 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia’s concurrence
objected to this notion that an existing regulation should be considered as part of the investment-backed expectation
inquiry because, in his opinion, Penn Central balancing “should have no bearing” in determining whether there was a
“total taking.” Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also infra note 138.
Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion in its determination the takings claim was ripe because the
regulations at issue prohibited any development of the wetlands. But because Palazzolo gained title to the property
only after the regulations had become effective, Stevens thought he lacked standing to challenge regulations predating his ownership of the property. Id. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Ginsburg filed a dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, disagreeing with Justice Kennedy’s ripeness
conclusion. She agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court that Palazzolo’s takings claim was not ripe because he
had never sought to develop only the upland portion of the property that was not affected by the state wetlands
regulations. Id. at 647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer filed a separate dissent to note that while acquisition
of a parcel of land after the adoption of restrictive zoning regulations may not automatically bar a takings claim, that
fact should be evaluated using Penn Central balancing, endorsing Justice O’Connor’s conclusion. Id. at 655 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
133
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
134
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 625-26 (“Where the state agency charged with enforcing a challenged land-use
regulation entertains an application from an owner and its denial of the application makes clear the extent of
development permitted...federal ripeness rules do not require the submission of further and futile applications....”).
135
Id. at 627. See infra note 235 (describing the meaning of “Hobbesian”). For an insightful reexamination
of property as a bundle of rights, including rights of the state, see Myrl Duncan, Reconcieving the Bundle of Sticks:
Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL L. 773 (2002).
136
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (“A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when
a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate what is taken.”). On the so-
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the proper inquiry for takings purposes was whether a landowner’s predecessor could have
successfully maintained a takings claim.137 This position did not represent a majority of the Court,
however, as Justice O’Connor’s concurrence emphasized that landowner notice of existing regulations
was a highly relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of a landowner’s investment-backed
expectations and the regulation’s economic effect under the dominant takings test, the so-called Penn
Central balancing.138
The result proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for the landowner, for Justice Kennedy did not
disturb the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s ruling that Palazzolo retained substantial value in the
unregulated upland portion of his property.139 Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the
Rhode Island courts to determine whether the wetlands regulation worked a Penn Central-type
taking.140 Palazzolo was unsuccessful in this effort.141 Nevertheless, although Palazzolo was unable

called notice rule, see Danaya C. Wright, A New Time For Denominators: Toward A Dynamic Theory Of Property In
The Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 188-90 (2004); Steven J. Eagle, The
Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 533 534 (2002); Michael C. Blumm, Palazzolo and the Decline
of Justice Scalia’s Categorical Takings Doctrine, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 137, 143-44 (2002).
137
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627 (“[w]ere we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title would
absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A
State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.
Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.”).
138
Id, at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Penn Central balancing test was inaugurated by Justice
Brennan’s opinion in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Lazarus, supra note 42,
at 767-72 (discussing how the Court developed the Penn. Central test); Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power
Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings "Muddle", 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 875-83 (2006)
(tracing how the historic trend of construing substantive due process claims as takings contributed to the Penn Central
result); Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property Theory, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
334 (2006) (discussing how different Supreme Court justices have adapted the Penn Central test to reach desired
conclusions).
Justice Scalia, also in the majority, wrote a separate concurrence largely criticizing Justice O’Connor’s
approach, suggesting the pre-existing notice of regulatory restrictions should have no effect on whether a regulation
worked a taking, except where it formed a “background principle” of state property law, so that a Penn Central
takings claim would be unaffected by transfers of title. Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Lazarus, supra note
44, at 817 (stating that Justice Scalia’s wrote his separate concurrence in Palazzolo for the “purpose of taking
deliberate and harsh aim at O’Connor.”)
139
Id. at 632.
140
Id. at 630.
141
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001). Following the Court’s decision, the Rhode Island
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to destroy the wetlands in pursuit of his proposed development, Justice Kennedy’s opinion was
largely favorable to the landowner, relaxing ripeness rules, eliminating the regulatory notice as a
categorical governmental defense, and demonstrating considerable suspicion of the state’s
“Hobbesian” environmental regulations.142
2004 witnessed the only dissent Justice Kennedy wrote among the seventy-seven
environmental cases in this survey. At issue was whether the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) could issue Clean Air Act compliance orders against the state of Alaska to stop the
construction of a polluting facility after EPA concluded that the state’s determination of “best
available control technology” (BACT) to reduce plant emissions was unreasonable.143 EPA and the
states make BACT determinations on a case-by-case basis, considering energy, environmental, and
economic factors.144 Each state administers its own EPA-approved clean air program, but EPA has
enforcement authority as well, and the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to take remedial action against
any state not in compliance with the statute, including issuing “an order prohibiting construction.”145
EPA invoked this authority to prevent the Alaska state agency from issuing a permit to the facility,

Supreme Court remanded the case to the state state superior court to analyze the takings claim under Penn Central.
Id. The superior court concluded that the proposed development’s negative effects on nearby Winnapaug Pond
constituted a public nuisance. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 2005 WL 1645974, *5 (R.I. Super. 2005). Further, since
half of Palazzolo’s property fell below the mean high tide line, under the state’s public trust doctrine, the state holds
these lands in trust for the public. Thus, Palazzolo had no right to fill any wetlands below mean high tide line without
state legislative permission, significantly diminishing any reasonable investment-backed expectations he might have
for developing the property. Id. at *8.
142
See supra notes 134 (ripeness), 136 (notice rule), 135 (Hobbesian state power) and accompanying text.
143
Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 468 (2004). Under the Clean Air Act’s
“prevention of significant deterioration” program for airsheds in compliance with national ambient air quality
standards, construction of any facility resulting in “major” emissions must be equipped with BACT. Id.
144
See id. at 468, citing Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000).
145
42 U.S.C. § 7413(a). See also id. § 7477 (“prevention of significant deterioration” provision also
authorizing EPA to issue “an order...to prevent the construction of a facility” that does not meet PSD requirements).
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alleging that the state-prescribed BACT measures were unreasonable.146 The state maintained that
under the Clean Air Act only a state has authority to decide which technology is “best available.”147
A five-member Court majority, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, sided with EPA, even
though it refused to give Chevron deference to EPA guidance documents.148 Nonetheless, the Court
considered EPA’s interpretation of its enforcement authority to be reasonable, based on an
administrative record that showed the state’s BACT would produce considerably more emissions than
alternative technology, and no evidence indicating that such an alternative was economically
infeasible.149
Justice Kennedy, for a four-member dissent that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, thought that EPA lacked authority to take enforcement action against a state
exercising its statutory discretion.150 Instead, he believed that EPA should have challenged the state’s
BACT determination in state proceedings.151 He also charged the majority with giving the EPA
interpretation inappropriate deference, maintaining that the majority “opinion is chock-full of

146

See Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 480 (describing the exchanges in the permitting
process for Red Dog Mine, a zinc concentrate mine 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle, which led to EPA’s 1999
order).
147
See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining "best available control technology" to mean “an emission limitation
based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation ... which the permitting authority,
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines
is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and
techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of
each such pollutant”).
148
Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 504 U.S. at 487. Under Chevron v. Nat. Resources Def. Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts give deference to reasonable agency interpretation of statutory ambiguities if
promulgated as part of a public accessible process, like notice and comment rulemaking. In this case the Court
accorded the EPA guidance only “respect,” as called for by Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) and
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
149
Alaska Dept of Envtl. Conservation, 504 U.S. at 501-02.
150
Id. at 503 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
151
Id. at 509.
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Chevron-like language.”152 In Kennedy’s judgment, the majority abrogated the cooperative federalism
scheme Congress constructed in the Clean Air Act. He declared that “federal agencies cannot consign
the States to ministerial tasks of information gathering and making initial recommendations, while
reserving to themselves the authority to make final judgments under the guise of surveillance and
oversight.”153
The Alaska decision is a telling one. Justice Kennedy not only issued his only written dissent
in an environmental case,154 he also departed from his fellow centrist, Justice O’Connor, a rare
event.155 Moreover, while the case turned on the intricacies of a complex federal statute, one would
have thought that those intricacies supported the respect the majority gave to the agency charged with
the administration of the statute, even if Chevron deference was inappropriate. Further, the text of the
Clean Air Act twice authorized EPA to enforce against noncomplying states and facilities.156 But
neither that text, nor the statute’s complexity mattered as much to Justice Kennedy as his conception
of the federal-state balance implicit the statute’s structure. Although quick to find federal preemption
of state tanker safety and hazardous waste worker training requirements,157 and willing to strike down
a local recycling as an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce,158 Kennedy saw in the
Clean Air Act a kind of “reverse preemption” in which state action foreclosed federal action. He
152

Id. at 517.
Id. at 518.
154
Professor Larazus, the closest observer of the Court’s environmental law opinions, considers Justice
Kennedy “the most significant Justice in environmental cases, at least to the extent he has been in the majority more
often than any other Justice, often providing the decisive fifth vote.” Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of
Nature, and the Nature of Environmental Law, 24 VA. ENVTL. L. J. no. 3 (forthcoming, 2006).
155
Of the cases we consider in this study, O’Connor and Kennedy agreed in 67 of the 75 cases in which both
participated, or 89% of the time. These statistics count only agreement with the majority or the dissent, not separate
concurrences.
156
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157
See supra notes 122-29, (discussing U.S. v. Locke), notes 63-64 (discussing Gade) and accompanying
text.
158
See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing Carbone).
153
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accused the majority of taking “a great step backward in Congress’s design to grant States a
significant stake in developing and enforcing national environmental objectives.”159 For Kennedy, the
priority in doubtful cases is not environmental protection but preservation of state autonomy. And
he’s strident about it.160
V. Decisions of 2005-06
Of the two celebrated property rights cases of the 2004 Supreme Court term, Lingle v.
Chevron received decidedly less press attention than Kelo v. New London, although it is not clear that
the result is less significant. Lingle concerned an Hawaiian statute enacted in response to the state’s
highly concentrated gasoline market that produced extremely high consumer prices. The statute
capped the maximum rent an oil company could charge dealers leasing its service stations.161
Chevron, one of only six wholesalers in the state, claimed the statute prevented it from recovering its
expenses and failed to “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest,162 a showing which the
Supreme Court seemed to require the government to demonstrate in its 1980 Agins v. Tiburon
decision.163 Chevron challenged the regulation, the district court twice ruled in favor of the oil
company, and the Ninth Circuit twice affirmed, all upholding the relevance of the “substantially
advance” test.164
159

Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 504 U.S. at 516 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Professor Lazarus, supra note 154, at *28, observed that Kennedy’s Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation
dissent “relied on remarkably strident rhetoric.” Lazarus suggested that Kennedy’s dissent erred by not considering
the reasons congressional distrust of state regulation in Clean Air Act: “what Justice Kennedy perceived as a problem
may better have been understood as a solution.” Id. at *30.
161
Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 533 (2005).
162
See id. at 534.
163
See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (holding that a landowner’s takings claim failed
because the ordinances at issue substantially advanced a legitimate state interest by protecting residents from the “ill
effects” of urbanization).
164
After the district court initially ruled in Chevron’s favor, the state appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
challenging the “substantially advance” test. The appeals court affirmed on the appropriateness of the standard,
although it remanded as to its application. Chevron v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000). The district
160
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Somewhat surprisingly, a unanimous Supreme Court proceeded to repudiate the “substantially
advance” test for regulatory takings.165 Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court denied that the test
had any “proper place in takings jurisprudence.”166 The test’s focus on the effectiveness of a
governmental regulation was, she maintained, actually a due process clause test, which was “logically
prior to and distinct from” whether its effect produced too great a burden on an individual property
holder.167
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence to emphasize that the Court’s abandonment of the
“substantially advance” test for a regulatory taking did not preclude the possibility that “a regulation
might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process,” citing his Eastern Enterprises
concurrence.168 His Lingle concurrence was a reminder that Kennedy–whose puzzling Laidlaw
concurrence indicated an evident hostility to governmental control169–was more than willing to erect a

court then concluded that the statute was unconstitutional by failing to advance a legitimate state interest, since the
effect of the statute would be to actually increase gasoline prices, not lower them. The Ninth Circuit again affirmed,
upholding the use of the “substantially advance” test. Chevron v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 2004).
165
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540. Justice Kennedy had been complaining about the Agins “substantially advances”
test as early as Lucas, when he argued in conference that the “Agins language is not correct and has to be explained.”
See Percival, supra note 36, at 10,654-55, citing Notes of Justice Blackmun (Feb. 29, 1992 & Mar. 1, 1992) Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, box 599.
166
Id. at 540. The Court made an exception to the statement in the text for land use exactions, such as those
involved in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring a “rough proportionality” between the effect
of proposed developments and requirements to dedicate land for public purposes), discussed supra notes 96-97.
According to Justice O’Connor, the purpose of regulatory takings jurisprudence is to identify regulatory
actions that are “functionally equivalent” to physical takings of property by focusing on “the severity of the burden”
the regulation imposes on private property. Id. at 539.
167
Id. at 543. This conclusion vindicated longstanding arguments by John Echeverria. See John D.
Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2000) (criticizing the “substantially advances” test as
the source of error in takings decisions, and analogizing the test to Due Process Clause means-ends analysis); John D.
Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory
Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853 (1999) (arguing the “substantially advances” test has no place in takings analysis); John D.
Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion,
17 VT. L. REV. 695, 716 (1993) (arguing for the establishment of a new takings standard distinct from due process
analysis).
168
Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring). On his Eastern Enterprises concurrence, see supra notes 84-85 and
accompanying text.
169
See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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new era of substantive due process review, in which federal courts would police the wisdom of local
land use regulations. Justice Kennedy’s apparent moderation in the takings context170 hardly seems
evident outside that context.171 Upon close inspection, Kennedy seems more of a regulatory skeptic
than a moderate.
Far more celebrated (or notorious) than Lingle was the well-known Kelo decision, involving
whether condemnation for economic development can qualify as a public use, a case which has
inspired a widespread political revolt.172 The city of New London, Connecticut–which had purchased
most of the land necessary for a redevelopment project in an economically depressed area– decided to
condemn fifteen “holdout” properties as part of its plan to revitalize an ailing economy.173 Unlike
most condemnations, however, much of the condemned land here would be used for private
residential and commercial use, including a resort hotel and conference center.174

170

See supra notes 131-42 (discussing Palazzolo) and accompanying text.
See supra notes 150-60 (discussing Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation) and 168-71 (discussing
Lingle) and accompanying text.
172
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See Timothy Sandefur The “Backlash” So Far: Will
Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform? MICH. ST. L. REV. (2006) available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=868539 (summarizing legislation passed in more than twenty states in response to Kelo to
restrict eminent domain powers); Eric Claeys, That '70s Show: Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform and the
Administrative Law Revolution, SANTA CLARA L. REV. (2006) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=925678
(urging states to amend eminent domain statutes to require heightened means-ends scrutiny); Bernard W. Bell,
Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers, 32 J.
LEGIS. 165 (2006) (discussing ways Congress could restrict states’ ability to exercise eminent domain power); Charles
E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development
Takings 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 491 (2006) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=888404 (calling on
states to amend their constitutions to bar the use of eminent domain for economic development); see also supra note
4, discussing commentary about Justice Kennedy’s role in Kelo.
173
Most of the properties necessary to carry out the city’s plan were acquired by purchase; only a few
required condemnation. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005). The city was clearly authorized
under state law to condemn land–even if it was already developed–for economic development if it were for a “public
use” and in the “public interest.” Id., citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-186 et. seq. (2005).
174
See Peggy Cosgrove, New London Development Corporation (prepared for the American Assembly),
available at http://www.clairegaudiani.com/Writings/documents/NLDC_Case_Study.pdf.
171
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The holdouts filed suit in Connecticut court, challenging this use of the eminent domain
authority. The trial court granted relief as to some parcels, but the Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed, ruling that all the condemnations were permissible public uses and in the public interest.175
A fractured Court upheld the city’s plan on a 5-4 vote.176 The majority opinion, written by
Justice Stevens, decided that the city’s determination that the neighborhood warranted an economic
revitalization program deserved a high degree of judicial deference.177 According to Justice Stevens,
the city’s carefully considered development plan ensured that there would be no illegitimate taking of
property from one owner to another without a public benefit.178
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supplied the deciding vote in the case.179 He did not share the
majority’s position concerning deference to the city, instead suggesting a need for heightened judicial
scrutiny of certain declarations of public use in order to guard against condemnations that amount to
“favor[s] to a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”180 In cases of
possible impermissible favoritism to private parties, Kennedy called for “a careful and extensive

175

Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 527 (Conn. 2004), relying on Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954) (upholding condemnation for urban redevelopment); and Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984) (upholding condemnation to break up a land oligopoly).
176
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
177
Id. at 2665.
178
Id. (“The city has carefully formulated a development plan that it believes will provide appreciable
benefits to the community, including, but not limited to, new jobs and increased tax revenue").
179
Justice O’Connor wrote for the four-member dissent that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas. She thought the majority had taken her opinion in Midkiff (upholding the use of eminent domain
to break up a land oligopoly) too far in authorizing eminent domain for economic development, “since nearly any
lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some incident benefit to the public.” Id. at 2675
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). She would restrict its use to programs aimed at curing “public harms” like blight (as in
Berman) and land oligopoly (as in Midkiff). Without such limits, she predicted that “[t]he beneficiaries are likely to
be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and
development firms. As for the victims, she claimed that the government now has license to transfer property from
those with fewer resources to those with more.” Id. at 2677. Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent on originalist
grounds. Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180
Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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inquiry” of whether the development plan would satisfy what amounted to a seven-factor test.181 This
fact-intensive inquiry seemed to be an effort to transform the minimum scrutiny advocated by the
plurality into something approaching intermediate judicial scrutiny–what Kennedy referred to as
“meaningful rational basis review”182–in keeping with his interest in reviving substantive due process
review, evidenced in Eastern Enterprises, 183 and his fidelity to fact-based determinations, epitomized
in Coeur d’Alene,184 among other opinions.
The final decision in this study was the most closely watched environmental law case of the
Court’s 2005 term. Again, Justice Kennedy supplied the deciding vote. The controversy concerned
two cases involving four Michigan wetlands, all lying near ditches or man-made drains that emptied
into traditionally navigable waters. In one case, the government brought an enforcement action
against a developer who filled without a permit; in the other, the government denied the developer a
permit. In both cases different district courts concluded that there was federal jurisdiction over the
fills. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, because one of the cases involved wetlands ”adjacent” to navigable
waters, and the other involved a wetland that had a hydrological connection to a navigable water.185

181

Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (calling for investigation as to whether 1) the primary beneficiaries
of the plan were the developer and private businesses; 2) there were more than incidental benefits to the city; 3) there
was evidence of depressed economic conditions; 4) there was a substantial commitment of public funds before
identifying most of the private beneficiaries; 5) the government reviewed several alternative development plans; 6) the
government selected the developer from a variety of competitors, not one identified beforehand; and 7) the private
beneficiaries were identified beforehand).
182
Id. at 2670. Kennedy suggested that the trigger for this more stringent standard of review was when the
“risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise)
of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.” Id.
183
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
184
See supra note 757 and accompanying text.
185
Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 391 F.3d 704, 709-10 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming a
lower court decision upholding a Corps decision not to grant a permit to fill a wetland that was adjacent to a tributary
to navigable waters); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court decision
which held that a developer was required to apply for a permit to fill several wetlands).
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), landowners are prohibited from discharging fill into the “navigable
waters” without first obtaining a permit from the Corps. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). For the purposes of the CWA,
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A divided Supreme Court split 4-1-4. Characteristically, Justice Kennedy was the pivotal
vote. Justice Scalia’s opinion for a four-member plurality would have swept away thirty years of
consistent Clean Water Act interpretation, relying on a 1954 dictionary to conclude that federal
jurisdiction was restricted to “those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of
water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] ... oceans,
rivers, [and] lakes.’”186 This interpretation would have precluded federal regulation of intermittent or
ephemeral waterbodies that are not permanent or continuously flowing–characteristic of many
Western streams–in the service of the plurality’s view of protecting state and local authority allegedly
threatened by federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction.187
“navigable waters” include a much greater scope of waters than navigable-in-fact waterways, as the CWA defines the
term to encompass “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). And the
statute’s legislative history indicated that the term should be construed to the fullest extent of federal Commerce
Clause jurisdiction. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236 (Sept. 28, 1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3821
(amending the original Senate bill to define the term “navigable waters”); S. Rep. 92-414 (Oct. 28, 1971) ), as
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3773 (calling for enlarging the federal role in water pollution control to include
navigable waters, groundwater, and waters of the contiguous zone).
The Corps and EPA issued identical longstanding regulations defining the scope of “waters of the United
States” for purposes of CWA jurisdiction to include: (1) all waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide; (2) all interstate waters including interstate wetlands; (3) all other waters such as intrastate lakes,
rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce.... (4) all impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under the definition; (5)
tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this section; (6) the territorial seas; (7) wetlands adjacent to
waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(6) of this section.” 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a) (Corps); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (EPA).
These regulations have been the source of a number of recent challenges to Corps jurisdiction over wetlands,
most notably in Solid Waste Agency of Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159
(2001), where the Supreme Court invalidated Corps jurisdiction over so-called “isolated” waters that provide habitat
for migratory birds (the Migratory Bird Rule). Id. at 174. Lower courts have split over how broadly the holding in
SWANCC applies. The Fifth Circuit narrowly construed the scope of Corps jurisdiction by requiring findings that a
wetland is “truly” adjacent to a jurisdictional water. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2003). Other
circuits interpreted SWANCC to have no limiting effect on Corps wetlands jurisdiction beyond invalidating the
Migratory Bird Rule. See Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 638. As the Sixth Circuit noted in Carabell, SWANCC did not
overrule the Supreme Court’s earlier decision upholding Corps jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands” in United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985). Carabell, 391 F.3d at 909.
186
Rapanos v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2225 (2006). Justice Scalia wrote for himself,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito.
187
Id. at 2225.
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But Justice Kennedy–whose opinion was controlling, as Chief Justice Roberts made clear188–
was unwilling to rely on a half-century old dictionary to resolve such an important question of federal
jurisdiction. Instead, he concluded that the Sixth Circuit correctly determined that a wetland is
subject to federal jurisdiction if it possessed a “significant nexus” to navigable waters, but the appeals
court had failed to consider all the factors necessary to ascertain whether the wetland in fact had the
requisite nexus.189 Kennedy claimed that "in most cases regulation of wetlands that are adjacent to
tributaries and possess a significant nexus with navigable waters will raise no serious constitutional or
federalism difficulty," adding that "[t]he possibility of legitimate Commerce Clause and federalism
concerns in some circumstances does not require the adoption of an interpretation that departs in all
cases from the Act’s text and structure."190
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Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), noting that “[l]ower courts and regulated entities will now have to
feel their way on a case-by-case basis,” but “[t]his situation is certainly not unprecedented;” under Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds....” Lower courts are now wrestling with what to
make of the rule in Rapanos.
One of the first post-Rapanos district courts to reach a wetlands jurisdictional determination interpreted the
fragmented decision to indicate that courts should find Corps jurisdiction if a wetland meets either Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” standard or the plurality’s “continuous surface connection” test. United States v. Evans, 2006
WL2221629, *20 (M.D. Fla. 2006). The First Circuit agreed in United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir.
2006) (either the Rapanos plurarity’s test or Kennedy’s test is sufficient for federal jurisdiction). But both the Ninth
and Seventh Circuit upheld federal jurisdiction based only on Kennedy’s test. Northern California River Watch v.
City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test to
determine jurisdiction over a pond adjacent to a river, but finding that “nexus” in the form of a surface connection
between water seeping over a man-man levee from the pond into the river); U.S. v. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723,
725 (7th Cir. 2006) (employing Kennedy’s test as “the least common denominator,” since the court thought it would
be a “rare case” where the Rapanos plurality and dissent would both find jurisdiction but Justice Kennedy would not).
189
Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist first brought the phrase “significant nexus”
into the Court’s wetlands jurisprudence when he wrote in his SWANCC opinion that “[i]t was the significant nexus
between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our reading of the CWA” in Riverside Bayview Homes,
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
190
Id. at 2249-50. Kennedy seemed to have exempted wetlands adjacent to navigable waters from his
“significant nexus” showing: "As applied to wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps' conclusive
standard for jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable inference ecologic interconnection, and the assertion of jurisdiction
for those wetlands is sustainable under the Act by showing adjacency alone. That is the holding of Riverside
Bayview." Id. at 2248. However, a Ninth Circuit panel recently ruled that adjacency of wetlands to navigable waters
is no longer sufficient to justify Clean Water Act jurisdiction, since the panel interpreted Rapanos to narrow the scope

43

Kennedy’s concurrence had much more common ground with Justice Stevens’ dissent, which
called for judicial deference to longstanding and reasonable administrative practice, than with the
plurality.191 Kennedy even referred to the plurality opinion as “inconsistent with the Act’s text,
structure and purpose,” a rather curious conclusion in a concurrence.192 He spelled out the
“significant nexus” test he called for in the following terms:
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable
waters,’ if the wetlands either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.” When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water
quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the
statutory term ‘navigable waters.193
Kennedy faulted existing Corps of Engineer regulations for their “overbreadth” and called for new
regulations concerning wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters, in order to ensure
the requisite ecological connection.194 Pending the promulgation of such regulations, the Corps
would have to make jurisdictional determinations on a case by case basis.195

of the Court’s Riverside Bayview decision. The court instead required a showing of a “significant nexus” between the
adjacent wetlands and traditionally navigable waters. Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457
F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2006).
191

Id. at 2252-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote for himself and Justices Souter, Ginsburg,

and Breyer.
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Id. at 2246. Moreover, Kennedy noted that since “the dissent is correct to observe that an intermittent
flow can constitute a stream,...[i]t follows that the Corps can reasonably interpret the Act to cover the paths of such
impermanent streams.” Id. at 2243. Also, he observed that the plurality’s conclusion that navigable waters may not
be intermittent was “unsound.” Id. at 2243. And he agreed with the dissent that “the fact that point sources may carry
continuous flow undermines the plurality’s conclusion that covered ‘waters’ may not be discontinuous.” Id. at 2243.
Finally, he rejected the plurality’s exclusion of wetlands lacking a continuous surface connection to other
jurisdictional waters. Id. at 2244. See also Donald Kennedy & Brook Hanson, What’s a Wetland, Anyhow?, 313
SCIENCE no. 5790, at 1019 (Aug. 25, 2006) (criticizing Justice Scalia for looking to an outdated dictionary, rather than
to contemporary environmental science—as Justice Kennedy did—concerning the scope of federal wetlands
jurisdiction in Rapanos).
193
Id. at 2248.
194
Id. at 2248 (calling for the Corps “to identify categories of tributaries, whether by volume of flow (either
annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant considerations.”) He specifically
approved the Corps’ existing regulations concerning wetlands adjacent to navigable waters because there was “a
reasonable inference of ecological interconnection” with navigable waters. Id.
195
Id. at 2249.
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Kennedy did not conclude that the wetlands at issue in Rapanos were beyond regulatory reach.
In fact, he suggested that they were probably jurisdictional wetlands, noting that “the record contains
evidence suggesting the possible existence of a significant nexus according to the principles outlined
above . . . [thus,] the end result in these cases and many others to be considered may be the same as
that suggested by the dissent.”196 Why, in light of these sentiments, Justice Kennedy concurred in the
plurality opinion was not at all clear.
VI. The Kennedy Profile
The chronology above illustrates Justice Kennedy’s increased role in environmental cases in
the 21st century. In the twelve years between 1988 and 2000, Kennedy wrote only nine opinions, or
just .75 per year.197 In the six years since 2000, Kennedy wrote eight environmental law decisions, or
1.3 per year, an increase of roughly 75 percent.198 Moreover, Kennedy’s role is increasingly outcome
determinative: of the nineteen post-2000 decisions examined in this study, five were decided on 5-4

196
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votes, and Kennedy was in the majority in all but one. 199 And of course Kennedy has written only
one environmental dissent.200
But this chronological presentation, while useful in understanding the development of Justice
Kennedy’s thinking and in illustrating his growing importance to the Court’s environmental law
decisionmaking, may fail to capture the contributions Justice Kennedy’s opinions have made in
discrete areas of environmental law, such as standing and ripeness, states-rights federalism, takings,
and environmental statutory interpretation–four areas of his most prominent contributions. This
section discusses each in turn.
A. Standing and Ripeness
Three standing cases figure prominently in Kennedy’s environmental portfolio: concurrences
in Defenders and Laidlaw and his majority opinion in Del Monte Dunes.201 In Defenders, one of
Justice Kennedy’s more telling early opinions, he was unwilling to join in Justice Scalia’s dismissive
treatment of the plaintiffs “animal and vocational nexus” theories of standing, reserving the right to
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See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001) (writing for a majority that included Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, and which Justice Stevens also joined in part); Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (joining Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s majority, which was also joined by Justices Thomas, Scalia, and O’Connor); Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (filing a concurring opinion and joining Justice Stevens’ majority opinion, which was
also joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); and Rapanos v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 126 S.
Ct. 2208 (2006) (concurring in the judgment, but filing a separate concurring opinion from the plurality authored by
Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas). Justice Kennedy’s pivotal role in
wetlands cases can be also deduced from the 4-4 result in a California wetlands case from which he had recused
himself. Borden Ranch v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s
decision that EPA had jurisdiction to enforce the CWA when a developer engaged in “deep ripping”—intensive and
very deep plowing through water features—without a permit on a former ranch with numerous water and wetland
features, although that jurisdiction did not extend to vernal pools, which the Ninth Circuit determined to be “isolated”
wetlands of the type exempted from CWA jurisdiction in SWANCC).
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Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502 (2004), discussed supra notes 143-60 and
accompanying text.
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See supra notes 55-61 (Defenders), 119-20, (Laidlaw), 96-102 (Del Monte Dunes) and accompanying
text.

46

consider them at a later date, under other facts.202 He also dismissed the Scalian proposition that
Congress could not establish standing for new causes of action.203
In Del Monte Dunes, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion rejected the application of the more
stringent “rough proportionality” test employed in exaction cases, but he upheld the lower court’s
submission of the takings claim to a jury.204 And his odd concurrence in Laidlaw suggested that
citizen suits might violate the executive prerogatives contained in Article II of the Constitution.205
The Kennedy standing record is thus a mixed bag–as is the Court’s record in general206–perhaps
reflecting his reaction to the substantive merits of the environmental claim, although his intimation in
Laidlaw has to be of considerable concern for environmental plaintiffs. 207
Kennedy’s chief ripeness decision was Palazollo, in which his majority opinion concluded
that rejection of the landowner’s repeated development applications indicated that the state was
unlikely to ever approve his proposed development, and therefore the takings claim was ripe.208
Kennedy’s Del Monte Dunes majority decision did not disturb a lower court decision which found the
city’s numerous denials of a beach development to be ripe.209 He clearly is quite interested in
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See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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removing ripeness burdens to landowners who submit numerous proposals to local governments and
claim that repeated governmental rejections work takings.210
Kennedy appears to be fairly evenhanded in his standing and ripeness decisions. While
opposed to setting high hurdles for landowners claiming takings, he is not an adherent to the Scalian
common law model. He is willing to entertain animal and vocational nexus theories of standing,211
and he believes that Congress has the authority to define injuries and chains of causation sufficient for
standing.212

Although he has raised questions about citizen suit enforcement as possibly

unconstitutionally interfering with the Executive’s Article II prerogatives,213 he seems largely
committed to allowing both landowners and citizen enforcers to have their day in court.
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B. States-Rights Federalism
Justice Kennedy’s interest in federalism is intense, of considerably greater magnitude than his
interest in environmental protection.214 But his record is a mixed one. His early concurrence in Gade
supplied the deciding vote to preempt an Illinois hazardous waste worker-training statute, apparently
viewing avoiding dual regulation as a higher priority than preserving state police power. This
concurrence advocating a broader preemption—based on the text of the statute—than the conflict
preemption endorsed by Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion.

Similarly, Kennedy’s majority

opinion in Locke preempted Washington state tanker safety regulations not on the basis of federalstate conflicts but on his interpretation of federal policy.
Kennedy’s 1994 Carbone decision–his first environmental law decision for the Court—was
also surprising for a professed states’ rights advocate.215 He viewed the Town of Clarkstown’s
ordinance aimed at promoting recycling as a protectionist measure, interfering with the flow of
interstate commerce, not as a measure aimed at managing the town’s waste problems.216 This
perception led the states’ rights defender to conclude that the local recycling ordinance substantially
interfered with his expansive notion of the dormant federal commerce power.217
These surprising decisions favoring federal hegemony stand in contrast to the more
prototypical Kennedy states’ rights position exemplified in the 1997 Coeur d’Alene Tribe case–
another majority opinion–in which he broadly interpreted state immunity from suits and read narrowly
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See supra notes 16-17 (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s limitations on the federal commerce power and
the Eleventh Amendment revolution during the mid-1990s).
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See supra note 16 (states’ rights advocate), notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing Carbone).
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See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 68.
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an apparently relevant exemption from this liability.218 His endorsement of case-by-case balancing
concerning the applicability of state Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal suits was not shared
by Justice O’Connor, who thought that federal jurisdiction should not be premised on judicial
balancing of federal versus state interests in suits seeking prospective relief.219

Kennedy’s

unsympathetic approach to tribal property issues was again evident two years later, when his opinion
for the Court rejected the Southern Ute Tribe’s claim to coalbed methane gas reserves.220 In so doing,
he ignored interpretative rules favoring tribes and federal retention of public resources in favor of
what he viewed as a “natural interpretation” of the definition of coal ninety years earlier.221 And
Kennedy’s states’ rights perspective dominated the only environmental dissent he wrote, as he
overlooked the text of the Clean Air Act and deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute in favor
of promoting his vision of an active state role in environmental policy.222
Kennedy’s states-rights federalism is certainly a hallmark of his jurisprudence,223 but his
states-rights philosophy has clear bounds. He is more than willing to preempt state statutes, even
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where they do not conflict with federal law.224 And his broad interpretation of the negative
Commerce Clause allowed him to strike down a recycling ordinance as protectionist in Carbone, even
though the restrictions imposed by the ordinance were felt more in-state than out-of-state.225 On the
other hand, Kennedy’s states’ rights pedigree was evident in his expansive view of state immunity
from federal suit in Coeur d’Alene Tribe.226 He also overlooked both federal land and Indian law
canons in rejecting the Southern Ute Tribe’s claims to coalbed methane gas, in an anti-federal if not a
states’ rights opinion.227 And his interpretation of the Clean Air Act would have effectively allowed a
state to displace federal action.228 So, although Kennedy is a card-carrying member of the states’
rights club, he has shown a proclivity to dispense with state police power where not doing so might
produce dual regulation.
C. Takings
The aggressiveness evident in Justice Kennedy’s standing and federalism opinions is not very
apparent in his approach to takings, which instead has been characterized by moderation. In Lucas,
he refused to join Justice Scalia’s effort to erect a significant categorical takings rule, opting instead in
a concurrence for a litmus test grounded on reasonable landowner expectations that could account for
changed conditions, new ecological understandings, and protection of what he termed fragile lands.229
This sort of fact-intensive inquiry is characteristic of Kennedy’s takings jurisprudence.230
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Fidelity to factual analysis also helps to explain Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Eastern
Enterprises, in which he refused to apply a takings analysis concerning apparently retroactive
legislation, choosing instead to conclude that the statute failed to satisfy substantive due process.231
Kennedy reiterated his desire to revive substantive due process analysis in his Lingle concurrence.232
This willingness to revive substantive due process echoes some of his readiness to suggest that citizen
suits might be intrude on the Executive’s Article II powers in his Laidlaw concurrence.233
Kennedy’s interest in ensuring that landowners get their day in court motivated his ripeness
ruling in Palazzolo,234 when he eliminated the prior notice rule that gave governments a categorical
defense against takings claims, referring to the government as Hobbesian.235 He also approved jury
determinations of takings claims in Del Monte Dunes, while refusing to apply a “rough
proportionality” test outside the exactions area.236
Another Kennedy concurrence supplied the decisive vote in Kelo, ratifying public use takings
for economic development.237 But he objected to the plurality’s call for great judicial deference to the
city’s redevelopment plan, calling for a “careful and extensive inquiry” to ensure that the public
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benefits were substantial and the private benefits incidental.238 This sort of fact-based scrutiny is, of
course, familiar.
Kennedy’s commitment to contextualism is quite evident in the takings cases. In Lucas, he
opposed categorical decisionmaking because it was not sensitive to changes in ecological
understandings and fragile lands.239 Factual analysis was also central to his acceptance of eminent
domain for economic development240 and whether a regulation “substantively advanced” a public
purpose, a test he convinced the Court was more appropriate for substantive due process than takings
analysis.241 He also wrote the Court’s opinion approving juries as determiners of whether the
application of a regulation to a property produces a taking.242 On the other hand, Kennedy refused to
approve a categorical taking rule in Del Monte Dunes,243 and his conception of the scope of the
exception to the categorical rule created in Lucas was much more expansive than Justice Scalia’s.244
Thus, while Kennedy may sympathize with the Lockean landowner confronted by the Hobbesian
state,245 he is unwilling to side with the landowner categorically.
D. Environmental Statutory Interpretation
Justice Kennedy’s review of environmental legislation is probably best characterized as
indifferent. He has written only a couple of influential opinions: his sole environmental dissent and
the deciding opinion in the 2006 wetlands case. In Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation,
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Kennedy’s dissent objected to the federal EPA effectively overturning the state’s interpretation of
“best available control technology” under the Clean Air Act.246 He seemed especially concerned that
under EPA’s – and the majority’s – interpretation, both the federal and state governments could
actively enforce the statute simultaneously, inconsistent with his understanding cooperative
federalism.247 But since simultaneous enforcement by the federal and state governments has long
characterized implementation of environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act,248 Kennedy’s
complaint seemed more appropriate for a legislator than a judge.
The wetlands case concerning the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction appeared to animate
Justice Kennedy, who again supplied the pivotal vote. Quite predictably, although he thought the
Corps of Engineers regulations were overbroad, his solution was individualized fact-finding to
establish a “significant nexus” between the wetland at issue and navigable waters.249 Although this
search may impose considerable administrative burdens on the regulatory agencies, the workability of
Kennedy’s nexus requirement was not his concern.
Although there are not many Kennedy environmental statutory interpretations, what we have
reinforces Kennedy’s commitment to state autonomy, which is clearly more important to him than
administrative deference or environmental protection.250 Also reinforced was perhaps the overarching
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theme of Kennedy’s jurisprudence: a commitment to judicial factual inquiry in the form of a search
for nexus.251
VII. Conclusion
This study reveals Justice Anthony Kennedy to be a jurist skeptical of sweeping doctrinal
changes and attached to incremental case-by-case decision making, in which judges are entrusted with
balancing factors and charged with explaining the connection between doctrine and context. Kennedy
may be a doctrinal minimalist, but he is not a judicial minimalist, possessing considerable faith in the
judiciary’s ability to balance factors like environmental protection, economic profit, and individual
liberty.
Kennedy’s willingness to entertain nexus theories of citizen standing and his acknowledgment
of congressionally-created standing252 reflect his commitment to judicial decision making, although
he has questioned the constitutionality of citizens suits under Article II.253 On the other hand, he is
impatient with government allegations that landowners’ takings claims are not ripe.254 He is eager for
takings claimants to have their day in court, and he is willing to have juries decide takings cases.255
Kennedy’s devotion to case-by-case balancing was evident in his rejection of the “notice rule,”
which had given government defendants in takings cases a categorical defense prior to his Palazzolo
opinion.256 He was also skeptical of the breadth of the categorical takings doctrine Justice Scalia
announced in Lucas. Kennedy instead called for a broad exception to categorical takings that would
251
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consider contextual factors like changed conditions and sensitive lands.257 Such factors can also be
balanced in substantive due process analysis, which Kennedy has sought to revive as a partial antidote
to an expanded takings doctrine.258
Kennedy is a determined states’ rights enthusiast, a vital participant in the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism revolution.259 He rejected Indian tribal land claims in favor of a broad application of state
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,260 and the only environmental dissent he has
written was the product of his fidelity to states’ rights: Kennedy thought that the federal EPA should
not overrule the state of Alaska’s regulatory decisions, despite statutory text apparently authorizing
just that.261 Yet his Carbone decision showed him willing to invalidate a local recycling ordinance on
Commerce Clause grounds,262 and he was quick to preempt Washington tanker safety and Illinois
hazardous waste worker-training laws.263 Apparently, Kennedy’s devotion to states’ rights does not
extend to what he considers to be overregulation: while he prefers state regulation to federal
regulation, he prefers one level of regulation to two, and the market to regulation. His states’ rights
advocacy may actually be part of a larger deregulatory preference.
But while Kennedy favors less regulation, he is not interested in dismantling all regulation.
That is clear from his pivotal Rapanos concurrence, where he refused to agree with the plurality’s
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effort to categorically scale back Clean Water Act jurisdiction, instead (and quite characteristically)
opting for case-by-case determinations of the relationship between wetlands and navigable waters.264
He also approved economic development condemnations in his deciding Kelo concurrence, although
characteristically he would have established a detailed fact-based inquiry to ascertain that the
condemnation was not for impermissible private gain without public benefit.265
Whether Justice Kennedy’s recent endorsement of environmental regulation is indicative of a
trend is hardly clear. But as long ago as 1992 he was fashioning rules to protect sensitive lands and to
account for unforeseen changes.266 He is certainly not as sensitive to environmental protection as he
is to fact-based decision making, states’ rights, or minimal regulation.267 But he is not anti-regulation.
As a professed devotee of private property rights,268 perhaps the best way to characterize Justice
Kennedy is as someone who, while not dismissive of environmental regulation, will subject it to hardlook judicial review. The architects of hard-look review would not likely have anticipated its
application against environmental regulation,269 but that may well portend its future in the Roberts
Court.
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At the end of the day, Justice Kennedy seems to be Holmesian in several respects. Like
Justice Holmes,270 he is a devoted case-by-case balancer. He is also skeptical of regulatory
improvement, 271 but he is largely unwilling to impede regulatory innovation. And, like Holmes, he is
relatively non-ideological, except that his commitment to states’ rights is quite un-Holmesian, making
Kennedy’s jurisprudence appear much more activistic than Holmes’ call for judicial restraint. 272 Still,
when Holmes wrote, “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience” as a critique of
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s jurisprudence,273 he could have been describing Justice Kennedy’s
attitude toward Justice Scalia. Holmes’ critique may very well help explain the divide between the
two justices. How this divide–between Scalia’s categorical distinctions and Kennedy’s fact-based
consequentialism–plays out may well characterize the nature of the jurisprudence that the Roberts
Court is about to create.

federal agency decisionmaking”); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) (discussing the emergence of “public law litigation”—civil disputes over constitutional or statutory
questions, rather than private party litigation—and the development of a more active judicial role in such cases).
270
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) (“I think that
the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.
The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is
simply to leave the very ground and foundations of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious….”). See also
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 131 (1992) (attributing to Holmes’
article, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894), the first “fully articulated balancing test [in] American
law,” marking “the beginning of modernism in American legal thought” and “the demise of the late nineteenth century
system of legal formalism.”).
271
On Holmes’ skepticism, see Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3,
254 (1962-63).
272
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, dissenting) (“This case is decided upon
an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with
the theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my
duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of the majority to
embody their opinions in law.). On Holmes’ commitment to judicial restraint and to majoritariansim, see G. EDWARD
WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 327-30, 343, 363, 391, 487 (1993).
273
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Holmes referred to Langdell, the Harvard
Law School Dean and founder of the casebook method of legal instruction, as “the greatest living theologian,” Book
Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880).
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APPENDIX A:

Supreme Court Environmental Decisions 1989-2006274
Year Case name
1989 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.

Citation
491 U.S. 1

1989 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation
1989 Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council
1989 Marsh v. Oregon. Nat. Resources
Council
1989 Cotton Petroleum Corp v. New
Mexico
1989 Hallstrom v. Tillamook County
1989 New Orleans Public Service Inc. v.
City of New Orleans
1990 General Motors v. United States
1990 California v. Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm'n
1990 Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
1991 Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier
1991 Illinois v. Kentucky

492 U.S. 408

1991 Oklahoma v. New Mexico

501 U.S. 221

490 U.S. 332

Kennedy’s role
Joined in both Justice
White's and Justice
Scalia’s partial
dissents from the 5-4
decision
Joined majority

490 U.S. 163

Joined unanimous
majority
Joined unanimous
majority
Joined majority

493 U.S. 20
491 U.S. 350

Joined majority
Joined majority

496 U.S. 530
495 U.S. 490

Joined majority
Joined majority

497 U.S. 871
501 U.S. 597

Joined 5-4 majority
Joined majority

500 U.S. 380

Joined unanimous
majority
Joined parts of the
majority opinion and
also Chief Justice
Rehnquist's partial
concurrence and
dissent

490 U.S. 360

274

This case table includes environmental decisions issued by the Court during Kennedy’s tenure. Case
names which appear in boldface type indicate decisions in which Kennedy wrote an opinion. Although the overall
vote count was not included for each decision, the table does note which cases which were decided with a slim fivemember majority. A small number of cases included in the tabular data indicate Kennedy wrote an opinion for the
case, but are not discussed in the article text. These decisions are marked with an *. We omitted these cases from the
discussion either because while the decision had a significant effect on environmental law, the case itself did not
involve environmental issues (United States v. Lopez; City of Bourne v. Flores), or because the decision involved an
original jurisdiction state boundary dispute (Louisiana v. Mississippi; Alaska v. United States).

59

1992 Chemical Waste v. Hunt
1992 Arkansas v. Oklahoma

504 U.S. 334
503 U.S. 91

1992 United States Dept. of Energy v.
Ohio
1992 Brulington v. Dague

503 U.S. 607

Joined majority
Joined unanimous
majority
Joined majority

505 U.S. 557

Joined majority

1992 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
1992 Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
1992 Gade v. National Solid Waste
Mgmt. Ass'n
1992 Mississippi v. Louisana

504 U.S. 555
503 U.S. 429
505 U.S. 88

1992
1992
1992
1992

502 U.S. 437
505 U.S. 144
503 U.S. 569
504 U.S. 353

Wrote concurrence
Joined majority
Wrote 5-4
concurrence
Joined unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Joined majority
Joined majority
Joined majority

1992 Yee v. City of Escondido
1993 South Dakota v. Bourland
1993 Nebraska v. Wyoming

505 U.S.
1003
503 U.S. 519
508 U.S. 679
507 U.S. 584

Wyoming v. Oklahoma
New York v. United States
United States v. Alaska
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources
1992 Lucas v. South Carolina

1994 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States
1994 C&A Carbone v. Clarkstown
1994 Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon
Dept. of Envtl. Quality
1994 Jefferson County PUD No. 1 v.
Wash. Dept. of Ecology
1994 Chicago v. Environmental Defense
1994 Dolan v. City of Tigard
1995 United States v. Lopez*

506 U.S. 73

Wrote concurrence

511 U.S. 809
511 U.S. 383
511 U.S. 93

Joined majority
Joined majority
Joined unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Wrote 5-4 majority
Joined majority

511 U.S. 700

Joined majority

511 U.S. 328
512 U.S. 374
514 U.S. 549

Joined majority
Joined 5-4 majority
Concurred in 5-4
majority opinion but
wrote separate
concurrence
Joined majority

1995 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon
1995 Louisiana v. Mississippi*
1995 Kansas v. Colorado

515 U.S. 687

1995 Nebraska v. Wyoming
1996 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida

515 U.S. 1
517 U.S. 44

516 U.S. 22
514 U.S. 673

60

Wrote majority
Joined unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Joined 5-4 majority

1996 Meghrig v. KFC Western

516 U.S. 479

1997 Amchem Products v. Windsor
1997 Bennett v. Spear

521 U.S. 591
520 U.S. 154

1997 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe

521 U.S. 261

Joined unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Joined unanimous
majority
Wrote 5-4 majority

1997 United States v. Alaska
1997 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency
1997 Babbitt v. Youpee
1997 City of Boerne v. Flores*
1998 United States v. Bestfoods

521 U.S. 1
520 U.S. 725

Joined majority
Joined majority

519 U.S. 234
521 U.S. 507
524 U.S. 51

1998 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe
1998 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov
1998 New Jersey v. New York
1998 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment

522 U.S. 39

1998 Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club

523 U.S. 726

1998 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

524 U.S. 498

1999 Amoco Production Co. v. Southern
Ute Tribe
1999 City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes
2000 United States v. Locke
2000 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Serv.
2001 Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass'n
2001 Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers
2001 Idaho v. United States

526 U.S. 865

Joined majority
Wrote majority
Joined unanimous
majority
Joined unanimous
majority
Joined unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Joined Justice
O'Connor's
concurrence
Joined unanimous
majority
Wrote opinion
concurring with 4member plurality’s
judgment and
dissented in part
Wrote majority

526 U.S. 687

Wrote 5-4 majority

529 U.S. 89
528 U.S. 167

Wrote majority
Wrote concurrence

531 U.S. 457

Joined majority

531 U.S. 159

Joined 5-4 majority

533 U.S. 262

Joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent

522 U.S. 520
523 U.S. 767
523 U.S. 83

61

from a 5-4 decision
2001 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
2002 Borden Ranch v. U.S. Army Corps
of engineers

533 U.S. 606
537 U.S. 99

2004 Alaska Dept Envtl. Cons. v. EPA

540 U.S. 461

2004 Engine Manfu. Ass'n v. South Coast
Air Quality Management Dist.
2004 Cooper Industries v. Aviall Serv.
2004 South Florida Water Management v.
Miccosukee Tribe
2004 U.S. Dept. of Transportation v.
Public Citizen
2004 Norton v. Souther Utah Wilderness
Alliance
2004 BedRoc Ltd. V. United States
2005 Alaska v. United States*

541 U.S. 246

Wrote 5-4 majority
Justice Kennedy did
not take part in this 44 decision
Wrote dissent from 54 decision
Joined majority

543 U.S. 157
541 U.S. 95

Joined majority
Joined majority

541 U.S. 752

Joined majority

542 U.S. 55

Joined majority

541 U.S. 176
545 U.S. 75

Joined majority
Wrote majority

2005 Kelo v. City of New London

545 U.S. 469

2005 Lingle v. Chevron
2006 S.D. Warren v. Maine
2006 Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers

544 U.S. 528
547 U.S. __
126 S.Ct 208

Wrote concurrence to
5-4 decision
Wrote concurrence
Joined majority
Wrote an opinion
concurring with the 4member plurality’s
judgment

62

